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5INTRODUCTION
National competitiveness is a very complex reality to be easily 
measured. There are several important components of com-
petitiveness. Competitiveness is at the centre of many analy-
ses applying different approaches to evaluate it. Usually, the 
main focus is put on changes of productivity growth as a key 
driver of competitiveness in the long run. 
In recent years, for comparative studies analysts use the Glob-
al Competitiveness Indexes of the World Economic Forum as 
a representative tool, evaluating a weighted average of many 
different components, each of which reflects one aspect of 
competitiveness of 134 countries. These components are 
grouped into 12 pillars of economic competitiveness. To the 
Basic requirements belong Institutions, Infrastructure, Macr-
oeconomic stability and Health and primary education, which 
are of key importance for factor-driven economies. As Effi-
ciency enhancers into the Global Competitiveness Index are 
incorporated:  Higher education and training, Goods market 
efficiency, Labor market efficiency, Financial market sophis-
tication, Technological readiness, Market size. These compo-
nents are crucial for efficiency-driven economies. As Innova-
tion and sophistication factors the Global Competitiveness 
Index includes Business sophistication and Innovation. 
In this Report the stage of development of Bulgaria is charac-
terized as efficiency-driven. In comparison, for Finland, Den-
mark, the Czech Republic, etc. this characteristic is innovation 
driven, Estonia is in a transition from an efficiency-driven to 
an innovation-driven economy.  
Bulgaria is ranked 76th in the Overall Global Competitiveness 
6Index. In the first pillar, Institutions, there are three indica-
tors very important for Bulgaria. The first one is Public trust 
in politicians. Denmark is ranked 2nd, Finland 3rd, Estonia 44th, 
Bulgaria 112th, the Czech Republic 117th. For the indicator Ju-
dicial independence Bulgaria is on the 110th place, Finland is 
2nd, Denmark 5th, Estonia 27th, Czech Republic 61st. 
In the second pillar, Infrastructure, the indicator Quality of 
overall infrastructure, presents the following rankings: Bul-
garia is occupying the 109th place (Finland 5th, Denmark 7th, 
Estonia 37th, Czech Republic 51st). 
The fourth pillar concerns Health and primary education. The 
indicator Quality of primary education places Bulgaria 79th (Fin-
land 1st, Estonia 11th, Denmark 14th, and Czech Republic 15th). 
The indicator Quality of the education system within the fifth 
pillar (Higher education and training) indicates that Bulgaria 
is ranked 81st (Finland 1st, Denmark 6th, Czech Republic 26th, 
Estonia 30th)  
According to data on the indicator Brain drain (within the seventh 
pillar, Labor market eﬃciency), Bulgaria takes the 127th place (Fin-
land 7th, Denmark 17th, Czech Republic 43rd, Estonia 46th). 
Based on the considerable amount of Foreign Direct Investments 
(FDI) inﬂows to Bulgaria in recent years, it is interesting to assess
their contribution to the eﬃciency of the economy.Within the ninth
pillar on Technological readiness, the indicator FDI and technology 
transfer, Bulgaria is ranked 115th, which means that compared to 
the rest of the world FDI in Bulgaria have rarely been transferring 
technology to the country. (The same indicator for the Czech Re-
public is 13, for Estonia 25, for Denmark 41, for Finland 71.)
Within the 11th pillar on Business sophistication there is the 
indicator on Nature of competitive advantage. The advantag-
7es of the Bulgarian economy are ranked 100th, while those of 
Denmark are on the 3rd place, of Finland on the 6th place, of the 
Czech Republic on the 48th place, of Estonia on 62ndplace. 
Innovation is the key not only for increasing competitive-
ness, but also for resisting the impact of the global econom-
ic crisis. According to the indicator Capacity of innovation 
(within the twelfth pillar), Bulgaria is on the 80th place (Fin-
land on the 5th place, Denmark on the 7th place, the Czech 
Republic on the 24th place, Estonia on the 40th place). The 
indicator Company spending on research and development 
also shows that Bulgaria is ranked 101, which also suggests 
that foreign companies did not use the local human capaci-
ties for their research activities. University-industry research 
collaboration is also very low in comparative terms (92nd 
place for Bulgaria, 4th for Finland, 7th for Denmark, 26th for 
the Czech Republic, 29th for Estonia). Special attention has 
to be directed to the indicator Government procurement of 
advanced technological products, where Bulgaria is ranked 
82nd, Finland 7th, Denmark 10th, Estonia 18th, the Czech Re-
public 35th. If we take the indicator Availability of scientists 
and engineers, we can realize the linkage with the indicator 
Brain drain. According to the availability of scientists and 
engineers, Bulgaria is on the 93rd place. 
It is worth noting that according to the Global Competitive-
ness Indexes of the World Economic Forum the three most 
problematic factors for doing business in Bulgaria are corrup-
tion, inefficient government bureaucracy and inadequately 
educated workforce.
The IMD World Competitiveness Ranking is another source of 
information being a picture of competitiveness at a certain 
point of time. Simultaneously, it is also looking at the evolu-
tion of countries’ performances over the longer period. Of 
8the 57 economies ranked by IMD, all of the Nordic economies 
have increased or maintained their rankings compared to 
the US: Denmark improves one rank to 5th position, Sweden 
moves up 3 places to 6th, and Finland, a huge bound from 15th 
place last year to 9th place. Norway maintains its 11th position. 
The most spectacular movement is seen for Estonia, falling 12 
ranks to 35th place. Some countries suffered important rever-
sals: Greece (52nd) fells 10 places, followed by Romania (from 
45th to 54th). Other important declines include: Hungary (from 
38th to 45th), Spain (from 33rd to 39th) and Ireland (from 12th to 
19th). And to think that Ireland was ranked 5th in 2000!
According to the latest IMD’s publication (World Competitive-
ness Yearbook, 2009 WCY Rankings, May, 2009), the competi-
tiveness of the Bulgarian economy is ranked 38 , one score 
higher than in 2008. More advanced positions are taken by 
Denmark (5th), Finland (9th), Austria (16th), Czech Republic 
(29th), Lithuania (31st), Slovenia (32nd), Slovak Republic (33rd), 
and Estonia (35th). Behind the competitiveness ranking posi-
tion of Bulgaria are Poland (44th), Hungary (45th), Italy (50th), 
Greece (52nd), Croatia (53rd) and Romania (54th). The WCY re-
lies strongly on hard statistical data, which represents 2/3 in 
the overall ranking (1/3 are opinion data). IMD’s definition of 
competitiveness is: “How nations and businesses are manag-
ing the totality of their competencies to achieve greater pros-
perity”. Competitiveness is not just about growth or econom-
ic performance but should take into consideration the “soft 
factors” of competitiveness, such as the environment, quality 
of life, technology, knowledge, etc. The research of IMD also 
shows that the size of economies is becoming more relevant 
and large populated economies present a different competi-
tive model than smaller ones. Consequently, rankings split by 
population size (above and below 20 mln.) allow comparisons 
between countries that are of a similar size and compete in 
9the same “playing field”. (IMD World Competitiveness Year-
book 2009). 
The present publication aims at expanding the empirical 
knowledge on the current state of competitiveness of the Bul-
garian economy taking into account sector analyses, depth of 
competitiveness, factors influencing competitiveness, etc.    
Ivanka Petkova, PhD
Chairperson,  
Economic Policy Institute
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CHAPTER ONE
INVESTMENT POLICY AND EUROPEAN FUNDS
11
Nina Radeva
Deputy Minister,  
Ministry of Economy and Energy of the Republic of Bulgaria
The main negative eﬀect of the economic crisis for Bulgaria will
ﬁnd expression in the slowdown of the GDP growth rate, of the
foreign capital inﬂows – both foreign direct investments (FDI)
and investment activity based on mutual ﬁnancing. Small and
middle enterprizes (SME) will be the most damaged as they are 
highly dependent on the crediting of their businesses.
The newly established as well as innovative companies will also 
suﬀer from ﬁnancial insuﬃciency because in their ﬁrst years
credits are badly needed. The data from the Ministry of Finance 
indicates that this year nine new procedures are planned to start 
in their support with a total estimate of EUR 385,9 mln. EUR 250 
mln. of them are expected to go to the SME in the country. The 
budget of ﬁve procedures within the program’s framework is ex-
panded by nearly BGN 100 mln. Unfortunately, if some of the re-
sources are not absorbed in 2009, it will be extremely diﬃcult to
renegotiate them at a later stage.
Labor productivity growth could not be achieved without innova-
tions. For its part, the increased labor productivity may turn the 
economic crisis into an opportunity. Unfortunately, our country 
may face signiﬁcant diﬃculties regarding the implementation of 
the Operational Programme “Competitiveness”. For the time be-
ing, the absorption rate of the resources available on the program 
from the Bulgarian business is unsatisfactory. There is nearly EUR 
1,2 bln. in the European budget intended for the improvement of 
the competitiveness of our companies but these ﬁnances must be
absorbed not later than 2013.
The third priority of the program for the establishment of 
guarantee funds, risk capital funds and micro crediting is yet 
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to start. Another option for Bulgaria is to participate in the 
program JEREMIE. It consists of a set of instruments aimed at 
creating improved access to financing for SME on national, 
regional and local level. This measure is envisaged for the pe-
riod 2007-2013.
Stoyan Stalev
Executive Director,  
Invest Bulgaria Agency
Only for the last three years EUR 21 bln. have been invested 
in Bulgaria, while for the whole period 1999 – 2000 they were 
around EUR 31 bln. Despite the increase during the last years, the 
country still lags behind with the FDI due to the poor state of the 
infrastructure. Bulgaria shares the bottom places in Europe when 
it comes to investments in infrastructure.
In comparison with the same period last year FDI have slumped 
by 30 % until January 2009 and they amount to EUR 250 mln. The 
inconclusive data gives grounds to expect 20 – 30 % annual decline 
in all investment ﬁelds. According to the initial data, for the last year
investments in Bulgaria amount to EUR 6,163 bln. This is compara-
ble with the 2006 level when they reached EUR  6,158 bln. For the 
time being, 2007 holds the record for investments when Bulgaria 
managed to attract EUR  8,488 bln. of foreign capital. The 2007 data 
have been revised and increased by EUR 1,5 bln. The same tenden-
cy, though on a smaller scale, could be expected for 2008.
The top investor in the country remains Austria with EUR 5,427 
bln., i.e. 16 % of all investments in Bulgaria. It is worth mentioning 
that Austria is the biggest investor in Romania as well. The sec-
ond place goes to the Netherlands by EUR 3,949 bln. (11 %), fol-
lowed by Greece with EUR 3,07 bln. (9 %) and Great Britain with 
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EUR 2,741 bln. (8 %). The ﬁfth position belongs to Germany with
EUR 2,105 bln. or 6 %, which does not match with its status of the 
biggest trade partner of Bulgaria and reveals potential for future 
investments. Other countries with stable investment positions are 
Cyprus, Belgium and Luxemburg, the USA, Hungary and Italy.
The sector that managed to attract the largest share of the FDI is 
real estates with EUR 7,409 bln. or 22 % of all the investments. The 
other sectors that absorbed major investments are ﬁnancial services
(EUR 6,296 bln. or 19 %), infrastructure with EUR 6,225 bln. (19 %), 
trade (EUR 5, 458 bln. or 17 %) and manufacture (EUR 2,131 bln. i.e. 
6 %). Regardless of the increase in the last years, Bulgaria is in ar-
rears with the FDI mainly because of the state of the infrastructure, 
which is a key factor for the overall attractiveness of the country.
Presently, Bulgaria must prioritize the attraction of investments 
in electronic engineering, electronics and auto parts, which 
could make it a supplier for the countries in the region. From the 
beginning of its foundation, Invest Bulgaria Agency has support-
ed 113 projects with investments of EUR 9,2 bln. and 45 382 new 
workplaces created.
Boyko Dimitrachkov
Member of the Board of Management,  
E.ON Bulgaria EAD
In times of crisis, several main factors are important for Bulgaria. 
These are greenﬁeld investment projects that could largely con-
tribute to the fast and less painful recovery of the country. Unfor-
tunately, they are highly dependent on the signals that Bulgaria 
transmits to potential investors. They seek security, stability and 
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foreseeability, which our political environment failed to produce 
in the last 20 years. Troubled institutional environment resulted 
in a dysfunctional legal system.
The status of the labor force stands out as another problem – it 
used to be high qualiﬁed and cheap. Lately, a tendency towards
its insuﬃciency and poor preparation has been observed. Ad-
ditionally, quick ageing is in progress on the labor market and 
compared to other countries, the force becomes expensive.
Labor legislation in the country allows workers’ or personnel dis-
missals only by mutual consent or under organizational changes, 
which leads to long-term employment. Consequently, this situa-
tion does not stimulate qualiﬁcation improvement and produc-
tivity of labor.
Another serious disadvantage that prevents investment inten-
tions from materializing is the bad physical infrastructure, which is 
key to Bulgarian and foreign investors alike. The loss of resources 
from the EU funds produces additional obstacles for its improve-
ment.
A few measures must be adopted on governmental level in order 
to create favorable environment for doing business in Bulgaria. 
First of all, a clear position regarding the crisis must be held in 
public and then an explicit program must be prepared and im-
plemented.
When it comes to solving all the cited problems, a matter of ex-
ceptional importance is the normalization of Bulgaria – EU rela-
tions. One should not underestimate the modernization of the 
educational system as it precedes and deﬁnes the structure and
quality of the labor market. Its connection with the needs of the 
business and the economy should be made a priority.
15
Mariana Trifonova 
Project Assistant,  
Economic Policy Institute
(Summary and current trends)
From the beginning of this year, as a result of the global eco-
nomic crisis, we observe certain hesitation and caution on be-
half of the foreign investors when it comes to the economies in 
Central and Southeastn Europe, which until recently rejoiced 
at signiﬁcant investment interest. Even last year the drop in
FDI for SEE was 22 % and the Vienna Institute of International 
Economic Analyses predicts their decline in 2009 to continue 
with at least 40 – 50%. For Bulgaria, in particular, the National 
Bank data from June, 17th indicate a dramatic slump in FDI for 
the period January – April 2009, which means that investments 
tantamount to EUR 955 mln. In comparison, for the same pe-
riod last year the ﬁgures were EUR 1,9 bln. Although foreign
capital in the country shrank up by 71 % in April 2009, quite a 
few analysts point out that Bulgaria is in a far more favorable 
position than Romania and it will not be the country in the 
region to be most aﬀected by the crisis. Such claims are based
on the competitive advantages of Bulgaria in view of the low 
taxes and the relatively smaller drop in FDI. A prove in this re-
spect is the relatively small number of production capacities, 
property of transnational corporations, which were closed 
down in Bulgaria.
If we examine the preliminary data of the Bulgarian National 
Bank concerning investments by branches, we will notice a 
considerable stagnation in construction. Investments for the 
first quarter of the year equal to EUR 73,8 mln. (EUR 102,4 mln. 
for the period January – March last year). Although the eco-
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nomic crisis undoubtedly has a very negative effect on the 
Bulgarian economy, the investments shrinkage in certain sec-
tors such as construction that have experienced dispropor-
tional growth in recent years, may create new opportunities. 
They are related to the allocation of resources to other sectors 
and to the chance for further development.
In crisis conditions, the adequate governmental policy 
for attracting foreign investments is crucial and priority 
should be given to projects with high added value as en-
ergy supplies from alternative resources, information and 
communication technologies. The business conditions in 
Bulgaria are traditionally referred to as very attractive but 
flexible and creative policies should be implemented in 
order to prevent loss of investors from the country. In this 
respect, in June 2009, the government announced its in-
tention to support foreign investments by constructing 
industrial zones and the first seven of them were sup-
posed to be ready by the year’s end. For this purpose, the 
National Company Industrial Zones was established. The 
financing is supposed to come from the state budget and 
the Operational Programme “Regional Development”. An 
interest in the industrial parks is expected from Japan, 
China, India, Russia, Israel and the USA. However, for the 
time being, there are considerable and ubiquitous delays 
in all construction activities and the deadlines for the 
seven zones will not make exceptions.
Presently, in this delicate situation, it is very important to 
consider the potential risks in the implementation of such 
major projects. First, there is the danger of the industrial 
zones remaining empty. It is necessary to analyze whether 
their construction from the business to the business does 
not offer better chances for finding investors who will re-
main in them. Attention should be paid also to the precon-
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ditions for financial losses to the exchequer due to public 
orders carried out incorrectly, misappropriations and cor-
ruption practices. Additionally, the new government de-
clared reassessment of the economic profitability of major 
state-funded projects.
Government officials launched the idea for the state to start 
directly supporting investors by co-financing part of the in-
vestments – a measure that has been used for years in some 
of the old member states of the EU like the UK and Ger-
many. The main obstacles for the adoption of such policies, 
however, are related predominantly to the concerns from 
the recent months about the budget balance. Earnings col-
lection is 16 % lower than the envisaged one and if the ten-
dencies in revenues and expenditures remain unchanged, 
a deficit of BGN 2,5 bln. is expected in the end of the year. 
According to its first fifteen anti-crisis measures, the gov-
ernment plans to support foreign investments by approv-
ing the “one desk service” in the Invest Bulgaria Agency as 
well as expanding its administrative rights in order to inter-
act more intensively with the ministries. The measures also 
envisage a lowering in the threshold for investors whose 
projects could be co-financed by the state. 
Another possible direction of the government’s investment 
policy is the mitigation of the shock from the drop in FDI by 
making good use of the reserves that exist with regard to 
the frozen European funds. On May 27th, 2009 the Minister 
for Economy and Energy signed with the European Invest-
ment Fund (EIF) a Framework and Financial agreement for 
the implementation of the JEREMIE Initiative in Bulgaria. 
This is expected to facilitate SME access to risk capital in 
niches where the bank financing is insufficient. EUR 200 
mln. will be transferred from the EIF and they will be used 
for the capitalization of the specially established enterprise, 
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registered by the Bulgarian Development Bank. EIF will be 
the majority shareholder and it will manage the resources 
on behalf of and in favor of Bulgaria. The EIF is entitled to 
the refunds for management expenses of the Holding Fund 
but not to profits and dividends. The Holding Fund chooses 
its financial intermediaries on a competitive basis and they 
provide the approved financial products to the SME.
The quality and characteristics of the labor force are key 
factors for the attraction of foreign capitals and a special 
emphasis should be put on education. The cooperation 
between the educational institutions and the business 
in Bulgaria is still at a rather unsatisfactory level and the 
economic crisis additionally complicates the interaction 
between them. However, individual examples of common 
interest and good will do exist. For an instance, in June 
2009 a cooperation agreement was signed between the 
Technical University, Sofia (TU) and the Bulgarian Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry. The aim is to improve the pro-
fessional qualification of the students through additional 
training and then they, as prospective employees, will im-
prove the competitiveness of the Bulgarian firms. For now, 
the cooperation agreement will have two particular forms. 
The first project is for the construction of a Techno park in 
TU campus, which will be complemented by a business in-
cubator. The other initiative is related to the organizing of 
training courses with the active participation of specialists 
from Bulgarian and German companies as well as members 
of the German Chamber of Small and Middle Enterprises.
The establishment of university career centers from the Busi-
ness Foundation for Education should also be associated with 
the good practices in this sphere. These centers provide con-
sultative and information services to the students but maybe 
their main function is to facilitate the contact between the 
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young people and the large companies looking for their in-
ternship programs and junior positions personnel.
In summary, the economic crisis creates conditions for uncer-
tainty and has strong negative impact on FDI inflows in the 
country. Possible counter actions should be sought in the 
improvement of European funds absorption as well as in the 
government’s policies for additional stimulus of the investors’ 
interest in Bulgaria. Along with the liabilities, the crisis opens 
opportunities for the realization of long-delayed reforms in 
numerous social spheres and for more efficient restructuring 
in some economic sectors.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE BULGARIAN EXPORT IN TIMES OF GLOBAL CRISIS
21
Tsvetan Simeonov 
Vice-President*,  
Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
In a broader perspective, 2008 could be deﬁned as a relatively
successful year, with suﬃcient growth rate, both in export and
in import. Eventually, the conclusions are not in favor of Bul-
garia, as the trade deﬁcit continues to grow. The positive signal
that the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI) 
receives from investors, operating in the country, is that for the 
time being, if any production capacities need to be shut down, 
they would not be the Bulgarian ones. With reference to the 
coming into force of a bilateral agreement avoiding dual taxa-
tion, the American companies intensiﬁed their interest in the
country, which is another positive aspect side. Specialists from 
both sides assess that this would additionally contribute to 
higher investment activity because in Bulgaria business condi-
tions deteriorate slower in comparison with those in the USA. 
The Bulgarian advantages consist also of its new position as 
an EU member state as well as a complex of other factors, for 
example its geographic crossroad position. Despite the nega-
tive impact of the economic downturn on such countries as Ja-
pan, they are still using the transit potential of Bulgaria. In this 
track of thoughts, however, one has to mention the necessity 
of priority improvement of the Bulgarian infrastructure (land 
roadbeds and ports). 
The negative aspects of the crisis for Bulgaria are mainly related 
to its export. The latest data available shows a decline in beverag-
es, plastics, etc. These are all sectors that until very recently were 
considered good opportunities for investments. Notable slump is 
observed in the trade relations with the neighboring countries. 
* Since June 17th, 2009 Tsvetan Simeonov is elected President of the Bulgarian Chamber of Com-
merce and Industry
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In the light of the upcoming stagnation in Western Europe the 
expectations for the demand of Bulgarian goods and services 
are not optimistic. A decline in the export for major foreign 
partner of Bulgaria like Italy.
A few conclusions could be drawn from the current situation. 
Firstly, there is a major discrepancy between the government’s 
envisages for the export development and the reality. The ini-
tial preparation of the export development strategy has start-
ed in 2007 but currently there are no indicators for its further 
implementation. After all, this is an underlying document and 
its ascertainments are correct but some of the conclusions are 
not. In that perspective, various political parties, in the con-
text of the forthcoming elections, seek signals from the busi-
ness and its organizations in order to adopt some suggestions 
that could contribute to economic revival after their eventual 
coming into power. 
A part of the mentioned above incorrect conclusions in the docu-
ment is related to the functioning of the Bulgarian trade missions 
abroad. Still, the dominant point of view is the concept that their 
main duty is providing support services for the ministry repre-
sentatives arriving for an oﬃcial trip. That is an exceptionally 
wrong attitude that calls for a change. The responsibilities of those 
trade representatives should remain speciﬁcally economic – sup-
port for investors and measures aiming at general improvement 
of the business climate. In times of crisis, a change in their duties 
and responsibilities and strict control over their eﬀectiveness are
required. In the current situation, it is crucial to be ﬂexible and to
react instantaneously. Bulgaria is in the good position of a small 
open economy where changes could be easily achieved but the 
available resources must be utilized. It is appropriate to endorse 
monthly reports of the trade representatives in order to moni-
tor the results of their work and if proved insuﬃcient, immedi-
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ate changes of the representatives should be made. If the new 
oﬃcial fails to improve the performance of the department, the
trade mission itself should be closed down.
A form of honorary representation also exists. Actually, these 
representatives do the same work. There is a good practice of 
sending trade representatives that actually provide for them-
selves and only in rare cases, they are given passports and an 
oﬃce within the diplomatic mission. Usually, they are even more
eﬃcient than the regular trade representatives. Although this
may not be their only occupation, sometimes the foreign trade 
turnover with the countries in which they perform expands up 
to eight times. At the same time, the expenses for such a repre-
sentative are up to ten times lower in comparison with the trade 
missions. Presently, Bulgaria has six trade missions abroad while 
within the institute of honorary representation we could cover 
three times all the countries in the world. In this sense, this is a 
signiﬁcant tool that needs to be exploited properly.
Clearly, the export grows with considerably slower rate than the 
import and the trade deﬁcit is larger and no signiﬁcant improve-
ment could be expected during 2009. Obviously, the crisis will 
not prevent the people from consuming – they will continue eat-
ing, drinking, and driving cars, although the latter will probably 
be more humble, with lower fuel consumption. As the demand 
will be limited, both the Bulgarian business and the relevant gov-
erning institutions must understand that the producers should 
not be unduly burdened with extra costs, waste of time for meet-
ing some requirements, ﬁlling in documents and submission of
information to numerous institutions. What is needed, is a re-
duction in the import and growth of the export; increase in the 
competitiveness of Bulgarian goods; improving the advertising 
for sale abroad; more eﬃcient exploitation of the available re-
sources; inclusion of NGOs in these processes. 
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The access to information and the participation opportunities 
for Bulgarian companies abroad have to be improved also by at 
least partial ﬁnancing within the budget of the Bulgarian Small
and Medium Enterprises Promotion Agency. Despite the expec-
tations for the approaching start of the Operational Programme 
“Competitiveness”, for the time being it does not function and a 
contract signed does not necessarily mean absorbed funds. Ac-
tually, in a situation of expanding crisis the companies that are in 
worsen conditions do not receive any support due to the insuf-
ﬁcient performance of the administration.
Bulgaria could not take the advantage of an increase in the cus-
toms duties or other similar barriers against the unfair competi-
tion of imported goods. Therefore, opportunities for raising bar-
riers against subsidizing, dumping products and lowered prices 
should be used. There are legal methods for restrained unfair 
competition. In Bulgaria a full awareness of those means does 
not yet exist as we are still in a process of exploring a whole new 
legal system – the EU acquis, containing set procedures versus 
dumping import and to prevent the access of such goods to the 
single market of the Union. 
The government positions within its now operating program 
for an export development must be realistic. Only two industrial 
zones are included in it for the whole mandate of 4 years. Not to 
mention that Ruse industrial zone is completely used up and the 
other one nearby Plovdiv could be considered a semi-industrial 
zone. In this regard, it is unacceptable to discuss the set up of 
another 180 within a year and a half. These false expectations are 
dangerous and harmful for the business climate. 
Despite the globalization and integration processes and soli-
darity, it is basically a wrong governmental approach to put the 
Bulgarian business in a less favorable position in absorbing the 
EU funds. An example for such indecency are the regulations, 
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related to the so-called Silver fund. The National Assembly 
adopted this law, explicitly prohibiting the pensions guarantee-
ing fund to be invested at the national government securities 
market, which is actually a pure discrimination of the Bulgarian 
stock market. At present, stock exchanges abroad are not bet-
ter capitalized and when it comes to investment, at least equal 
opportunities should be provided, not to mention the possibil-
ity for following a protectionist policy. 
Another example might be given with the infrastructural projects` 
tenders and particularly, the road construction ones. These ten-
ders are to provide and provoke European companies` partici-
pation as far as they are supposed to declare serious amount of 
guaranteed assets as well as a long run experience in the ﬁled of
road construction. In terms of economic downturn, this sort of 
anti-national approach is extremely unacceptable. At least equal 
opportunities should be provided to the Bulgarian business to 
participate in EU funds absorption.   
VASSIL VЕLEV 
Chairman,  
Bulgarian Industrial Capital Association
The information, forecasts and analyses provided below are 
based mainly on observing the industrial and the capital markets. 
It is a well-known fact that 60 % of the Bulgarian export goes to 
the European Union. Bulgarian economy is small and open so at 
the beginning of the crisis this took it to less favorable position. 
The accumulated inﬂation diﬀerences between the EUR zone
and Bulgaria amount at about 50 % since Bulgaria adopted the 
Currency Board Arrangements more than ten years ago. Some 
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negative aﬀects are observable in Bulgaria due to these arrange-
ments, although no other reasonable alternative exists. There-
fore, governmental measures need to be taken for avoiding and 
moderating these negatives. Among these negatives could be 
mention the accumulated inﬂation diﬀerences, which so far were
compensated by the growth of productivity. However, the po-
tential for further acceleration in productivity growth is limited 
and this is one of the reasons for the large current account and 
trade balance deﬁcit.
The crisis developed at lightning speed: while in September 
2008 Bulgarian business still engaged labor force from abroad, in 
October 2008, it already started dismissing the staﬀ. The Novem-
ber forecasts showed 30 % drop in industry for the ﬁrst quarter
of 2009. The same trend remained in January. The ﬁnal data for
January is already available (19 % downfall on a monthly basis) 
and supporting the mentioned above forecasts. 
It is extremely important how we refer to the crisis. The public 
needs to be informed about the current situation but at the same 
time going too far with the negativism would discourage foreign 
investors. The role of the mass media here is crucial in order to 
prevent additional self-restraints of the consumption and further 
deepening of the crisis. It is important to know what the actual 
picture is and to trace out speciﬁc measures in due time.
The statistic data shows over 27 % decrease of the import dur-
ing the ﬁrst month of 2009, which is actually a positive eﬀect of
the crisis. The current account deﬁcit has decreased with 45 % in
comparison with January, previous year.  
The overall forecasts concerning the sectors during the ﬁrst
quarter are described below. Thirty percent downfall is expected 
in industry. In metallurgy, machinery construction, mining indus-
try and electrical engineering the sales are expected to be 50 % 
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of those during the last quarter of 2008. The downfall in textile 
and clothing industry would be with approximately 40 % (a little 
higher in the textile industry). Cosmetics are foreseen to be cut 
by 15 %. Slight increase is expected in some sectors such as phar-
macy and food industry. 
The crisis spreads unevenly at time and in depth. The ﬁrst-level
sectors were aﬀected in its very beginning, then the crisis passed
through the middle levels and yet has not reached the ﬁnal-level
sectors. The recovery will proceed in the same order. Regarding 
the diﬀerences in each country, there is no panacea for common
recovery valid for each country. Bulgarian export decreased with 
27 %, but the Japanese – with 45 %. This clearly shows the ob-
servable signs pointing at a global recession. In February and 
March within the ﬁrstly aﬀected sectors, a decrease temporary
restrained and once again, it became observable in the end of 
2008. This stable trend is expected to remain at the very same 
level during the summer of 2009 and slight increase in the ﬁrst
level sectors is foreseen during the autumn. Specialists foresee a 
slow general recovery at the end of 2010. Bulgaria is not antici-
pated to reach its pre-crisis industry levels for the next two or 
three years at least.  
In addition, ﬁfty per cent increase of the budget sector salaries
is extremely out of place, having in mind the revenue plan is un-
likely to be fulﬁlled. As a result an increase of the administrative
wages is absolutely ungrounded. 
A few more factors contribute to the crisis’ negative impact on 
the Bulgarian export. The competitive advantage for some out-
side-EU and Euro zone countries (Russia, Serbia, Ukraine, Roma-
nia, Hungary, etc.) could be improved by devaluation of currency 
up to 25 – 45 %. This approach is unacceptable for Bulgaria since 
it is performing within the Currency Board Arrangements and a 
ﬁxed exchange rate against the euro.
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Another diﬃculty for the Bulgarian export is generated by the
unoﬃcial but wide spreading protectionist policy led by some of
the older EU member-states. Contrary, Bulgaria follows the World 
Trade Organization rules, though, a necessity of using anti-pro-
tectionism tools exists. Otherwise, the protectionist policy led 
by some older EU member-states along with subsidizing dump-
ing import from some other outside-EU states may have crucial 
negative aﬀects over the Bulgarian economy.
The stable positions Bulgarian economy still maintains are relat-
ed to banking system and the sound public ﬁnances.
A tendency of transferring orders from countries within the Euro 
zone and the Dollar zone to Bulgarian suppliers is also observable. 
Lately the dollar gained ground over the euro and as far as the Bul-
garian lev is ﬁxed to euro exchange rate this brings certain com-
petitive advantages to the Bulgarian producers. It is not a matter of 
new suppliers but if it comes to those already existing clients from 
EU and the USA, an optimizing of the supplies could be expected 
by increasing the Bulgarian share. Thus, strategic partnerships will 
maintain in the post-crisis times. Anyway, it would be a diﬃcult
year for the Bulgarian export and import. In this respect, there are 
a few measures that could mitigate the negative eﬀects:
• The Bulgarian Export Insurance Agency’s structure and its 
activities are not very popular. Currently we face delayed 
payments and even bankrupts of companies within old 
EU member-states. In this sense, extra security could be 
found in the export insurance the Agency provides. 
• The capitalization of the Bulgarian Development Bank 
has been improved considerably. In this regard, its po-
tential and resources are not used at the most, as well 
as the “exim” function that could and should be applied 
during the times of crisis. 
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• It is crucial and urgent also to economize on the whole 
foreign policy. The substitution of the honorary repre-
sentation for the regular trade missions is also a way to 
reduce the expenses and the organizational eﬀorts.
• The oﬀset orders are not taken enough advantages of.
When signing international contracts, a clause for coun-
ter purchase of goods should be included. 
In general, these are the main recommendations of the Bulgarian 
Industrial Capital Association. 
Kristofor Pavlov
Chief Economist,  
UniCredit Bulbank
The global economic crisis transfers to Bulgaria through three 
main channels. All the three of them are relevant to the export:
• Diﬃcult access to ﬁnancing;
• Drop in the external demand;
• Lack of competitiveness.
The latter concerns Bulgarian manufacturers of export products 
and is a result of the devaluation of the currencies of the SEE 
countries that have more ﬂexible currency regimes. They are a di-
rect competition to Bulgaria as they have specialized in the same 
products and aim at trading them oﬀ on the same markets.
First channel for “import” of the ﬁnancial and economic crisis to
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Bulgaria. During the boom of the economy for the last couple of 
years, the access to ﬁnances was rather easy. A signiﬁcant ﬂow of 
foreign savings was observed in Bulgaria and that led to quick 
running into debt of all sectors. Now we are facing a situation 
of signiﬁcantly diﬃcult access to ﬁnances as the foreign savings
ﬂow shrunk in the last three months of 2008. A direct expression
of this tendency is the decline of the Central Bank reserves that 
continues in the ﬁrst months of this year. There is no reason to
expect a change until the end of the year. Probably, we are at the 
beginning of a process that will continue in 2010. An expression 
of this diﬃcult access is the increase in the prices of credits and
all other forms of ﬁnancing in the economy. It will inﬂuence the
economy in two ways.
Firstly, it will force the companies to revise their investment plans 
for the following years since, on one hand, there is a diﬃcult ac-
cess to ﬁnancing and, on the other hand – a decline in the exter-
nal demand that will be supplemented by a drop in the domestic 
demand due to the deepening recession in the economy. That 
will make companies think twice about their investment plans 
and most probably the initiated projects will be put on hold.
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Secondly, the Bulgarian economy is in a considerable indebted-
ness, especially in a short-term perspective. This could be a chal-
lenge as it will be harder for the companies to re-negotiate their 
debts with upcoming days of payment in this or the following 
year. In extreme cases a higher rate of bankruptcies could be ex-
pected in sectors in which companies have allowed getting into 
indebtedness that endangers their solvency.
The National Statistical Institute data concerning the indebted-
ness of the Bulgarian economy from the consolidated sector bal-
ances show that in the end of 2007 in export-oriented sectors the 
overall indebtedness was lower that in the economy as a whole. 
The overall indebtedness consists of all attracted ﬁnances out of
the company’s own capital in comparison with the balance ﬁg-
ure. In the end of 2007 the overall indebtedness of the economy 
was 61 %. On the Graphic 1 the export-oriented sectors are in a 
frame, one can see that only in food and drinks the overall in-
debtedness is higher.
We have a similar situation with the banks’ indebtedness. It forms 
about 12 % of the consolidated level of indebtedness in the 
economy. Again, the ﬁgures are higher only in food and drinks
sector, but that is not uncommon as similar levels of indebted-
ness in this sector could be observed in the other countries from 
Central and Eastern Europe. It does not mean that the solvency 
of the companies in the sector is in risk. 
However, the very high levels of short-term indebtedness are dis-
turbing. They could be deﬁned as “moderately high”. A level of 
35 % for the economy as a whole is really high. This means that 
the debts with payment days within twelve months are 35 % of 
the companies’ balances. In extreme cases this could become a 
problem for certain companies. 
Having in mind the current situation of the economy, the par-
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tial data for 2008 on a consolidated level might look decent but 
it could hide companies which indebtedness might represent a 
risk for their solvency. Thus, the prognoses suggest an increase 
in the relative part of bankrupted companies in the present and 
the following year.
The second channel through which the global financial and 
economic crisis comes to Bulgaria is the slump in the external 
demand.
The growth in the export-oriented sectors in our economy is 
connected with that in the Euro zone. The rate of correlation 
between the growth on a 12-month basis for the Bulgarian ex-
port at current prices and the growth in export-oriented manu-
factures in the Euro zone is striking (data from the payment bal-
ance). The sole exception is the year 2007 when one-time factors 
inﬂuenced the Bulgarian economy. In 2007 there was a signiﬁ-
cant slump in the manufactured agricultural products. The verti-
cally integrated sector for the production of food and drinks also 
had its impact on the country’s export. Consequently, a situation 
in which the leading trade partners of Bulgaria are in recession 
leads to a slump in demand in all possible directions. It is on a 
wide basis, spreads to all ﬁelds and there is no way to prevent it
from transferring to the whole economy. The data from the na-
tional statistics conﬁrms this statement.
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Export growth in the Euro zone and Bulgaria
Sources: Eurostat, BNB
Changes in the production volumes 
of export-oriented sectors
Source: NSI
Graphic 2. Exp rt growt  in the Euro zone and Bulgaria
Graphic 3. Changes in the production  
volumes of export-oriented sectors
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Apparently, most vulnerable are the sectors that produce capital 
goods, machinery and equipment. Of course, sectors that manu-
facture long-term usage goods for the households will also suﬀer
considerably. This means nothing but slump in demand for auto-
mobiles, computers, etc. Bulgaria will be inﬂuenced indirectly as
it is specialized in the manufacturing of intermediate goods used 
in the production of the latter. 
Other sectors that could be negatively inﬂuenced are those that
are characterized by long cyclic recurrence. Their performance 
is immensely dependent on the performance of the economy 
as a whole. In the Bulgarian case, the sectors are those produc-
ing intermediate usage goods; chemicals; metals and textile, to 
some extent, when it comes to unﬁnished products. These sec-
tors form about 50 % of the country’s export, so the blow will 
be mainly on them.
Obviously, the sectors that will suﬀer least from the slump in exter-
nal and domestic demand are the non-cyclic ones: food and drinks, 
other goods for daily consumption, pharmaceuticals. Signal verify-
ing this thesis could be observed. These sectors form between 1/6 
and 1/5 of the overall commodity export of the country. 
The last channel for the transfer of the global economic crisis to the 
Bulgarian economy is the devaluation of the currencies of numer-
ous Central and Eastern Europe countries that have more ﬂexible
regimes for the exchange rates and that are direct competition to 
Bulgaria.
Main export-oriented productions of a country and their share of 
the overall commodity export are shown on Figure 1 and 2. In the 
second column are presented the main rivals that are specialized 
in the export of analogous products. In the third column, one 
may see how much these countries have devaluated their cur-
rencies since the beginning of the crisis. For example, in the food 
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and drinks sector that controls about 5 % of the export, the main 
competitors of Bulgaria from Central and Easters Europe are the 
Baltic countries, Poland and Croatia. They have devaluated their 
national currencies by up to 40 %.
However, at present, the depreciation of the currencies in the re-
gion does not inﬂuence considerably the export of the relevant
countries. For an instance, in the case of Poland that has most 
drastically depreciated its currency since the beginning of the 
crisis, there is no data showing any signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on
the amounts that Poland manages to export. One could reach 
the conclusion that the slump in the external demand is so dra-
matic that even a considerable devaluation of the national cur-
rencies is unable to aﬀect the drop in the export. Consequently,
it could not inﬂuence the slowing down of the countries’ econo-
mies that materializes itself through the channel of the slump in 
the external demand.
Presently, the currencies of the Central and Eastern European 
countries seem undervalued. A movement in the opposite direc-
tion is expected as soon as the global economy starts recovering 
and the global economic cycle starts improving. Then, they will 
come closer to the values deﬁned by the fundamental factors in
these economies. Despite this fact, no increase that could bring 
them back to the pre-crisis levels could be expected.
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Consequently, Bulgaria as an economy with a fixed exchange 
rate has a problem because it loses competitiveness of the 
export-oriented productions. When having a fixed exchange 
rate, the recovery of the economic competitiveness happens 
through the labor market. In such occasions, one could ob-
serve slumps both in employment and in the nominal levels 
of the salaries in order to compensate for the lost competi-
tiveness due to the fixed exchange rate. The unfavorable sce-
nario that has to be avoided is the one in which the economy 
adapts itself to the new conditions and solves these problems 
only through employment reduction. This will make the pro-
cess of accommodation of the economy very painful from a 
social perspective. In this respect, the measures adopted by 
the government are worthy of praise: to create stimuli for the 
companies not to dismiss workers, to switch to a part-time 
working schedule, etc.
Why is so important to quickly overcome the loss of competi-
tiveness? Most analysts expect the world economy to start re-
covering in 2010. When it begins, our foreign trade partners 
from the EUR zone will have to make a choice in which Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries to increase the orders for 
the production of various consummatives and intermediate 
usage goods. They will start with those countries that could 
offer lower costs and prices, that are more competitive. If, by 
that time, Bulgaria has not solved its problem with the lost 
competitiveness of the export caused by the devaluation of 
the currencies in the region, it might not be among the first 
to benefit from the recovery. The conclusion is that, if Bulgaria 
could not overcome this challenge, it will experience a longer 
recession in comparison with the other countries from Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
This is a problem that we as a society are about to face in the fol-
lowing year and a half because the world economy is expected 
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to recover in the middle of 2010. Until then, the problem must 
be solved to a suﬃcient extent. Otherwise, it will be an obstacle
for the competitiveness of the export and Bulgaria will not be 
among the ﬁrst in Central and Eastern Europe to beneﬁt from the
recovery of the world economy.
Yasen Georgiev
Executive Director,  
Economic Policy Institute
(Summary and current trends)
It is beyond any doubt that the economic downturn in Bulgaria 
was imported and is not due to internal factors. Nevertheless, 
logically, the global crisis found its implications in the country, 
ﬁrstly through reducing the FDI volumes, which started already
in 2008 and kept its pace with a diﬀerent intensity during the
whole year. Afterwards, the ﬁnancial and economic turmoil re-
sulted in shrinking of the Bulgarian export since the second half 
of the previous year. Thus, the lack of ﬁnancial resources was fol-
lowed by stagnation on the external markets and particularly on 
the most important one for Bulgaria – the EU internal market.   
If in the beginning of 2008 one could have hoped that the global 
crisis would somehow pass over Bulgaria, in the mid of the sec-
ond half of the year it was more than obvious that the country 
should prepare for harder times ahead, despite the outstanding 
economic performance in 2007 and the oﬃcial statements and
forecasts which aimed at maintaining calmness on the eve of the 
two forthcoming elections. 
Some of the ﬁrst indications of the impending challenges in front
of the Bulgarian economy proved to be the signs pointing at ex-
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port slowing down, which became evident in the third quarter 
of 2008. This trend sharpened in the beginning of 2009 and as a 
result the Bulgarian export registered a drop of 27 % for the ﬁrst
quarter and about 30 % for January – May 2009 in comparison 
with the same period one year ago. It is reasonable to think of 
even higher ﬁgures since the above-mentioned data of the Na-
tional Statistical Institute has a preliminary status. 
In this regard, it is useful to see how the export markets react and 
therefore, the latest available data, which concerns the ﬁrst three
months of 2009, should be taken as a basis. The export to the EU 
member states, which amounts to 65 % of the total Bulgarian ex-
port, decreased by 23 %. It is worth mentioning that the exporta-
tion to the old member states dropped by almost 25 % while to 
the new ones by 10 %. This lets one think that even lower ﬁgures
are to be expected along with sharpening of the crisis in these 
SEE countries.   
In accordance with the Bulgarian National Bank’s latest data, 
a more moderate decrease of the Bulgarian export is to be 
observed also in countries like Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Be-
larus, Switzerland and Norway where the volumes are smaller 
by approximately one tenth. Within the period January-May 
2009 the biggest reduction is in Ukraine (almost 60 %) and 
Russia (32 %), while the Bulgarian production sold in Switzer-
land even grew by 11 %. 
For the ﬁrst three months of 2009 the export towards the neigh-
boring Balkan countries shrank by 50 %. The breakdown shows 
volumes that are by 60 % lower when it comes to key export 
partner as Turkey, over 45 % to Serbia, 30 % to Macedonia and 
less than 6 % to Croatia. 
Although some Asian markets registered certain growth, the Bul-
garian export production to Asia declined by 30 %. For instance, 
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as of the National Statistical Institute, within ﬁve months the ex-
port to Indonesia increased almost three times and to Japan by 
a third. On the contrary, Chinese demand for Bulgarian goods re-
duced by 30 %. However, to be mentioned is data concerning the 
export for two important destinations for the Bulgarian export to 
the continent. To Saudi Arabia Bulgaria exported 93 % less than 
an year ago, while even a slight growth was registered towards 
Singapore. 
 Other relevant information for the export-oriented companies is 
which commodity groups were aﬀected at the most by the stagna-
tion of the external markets and the rising wave of protectionism. 
According to the available data of the Bulgarian National Bank 
for January-April, the biggest drop within the Bulgarian export is 
to be observed in the energy resources – it exceeded 50 %. Sale 
of raw materials abroad decreased by 40 %. The following mate-
rials were hit most severely – fertilizer (-75 %), ores (-57 %), ce-
ment (-55 %), iron and steel (-52 %), chemicals (-46 %) and wood 
products, paper and paperboard (-37 %). Positive values, though, 
were registered when it comes to the export of raw tobacco (46 %) 
and raw materials for the food industry (23 %). It is exactly the 
volumes of food and tobacco that increased respectively by 10 % 
and 90 %. In spite of them the consumer goods group decreased 
by 7 % as a whole and even the growth in medicines and cos-
metics export (15 %) was not enough to change the direction. 
The negative total ﬁgure is mainly due to the decline in export of
beverages (almost 30 %), clothing and footwear (19 %), furniture 
and household appliances and others.
The aforementioned common trend did not skip the export of in-
vestment goods as well. Their overall decline (24 %) was a result of 
a smaller demand for machines, equipment, and spare parts on for-
eign markets. A mitigating eﬀect was achieved through the growth
rates in exporting vehicles (37 %) and electrical machines (7 %). 
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In times of declining foreign trade rates in Bulgaria one could wit-
ness a more accelerated slowdown by the import than by the ex-
port which results in improvement of the trade balance and re-
ducing of the current account deﬁcit. However, this should not be
regarded even as a small achievement of the Bulgarian economy 
rather than a logical consequence of the present situation. There-
fore, the times of crisis oﬀer the most appropriate occasion for
implementation of structural changes in the Bulgarian economy, 
which restructuring should foster export-oriented companies. 
To a large extent the crisis has just speeded up processes which 
country’s economy was about to face sooner or later. Double-digit 
growth rates and quick proﬁts are irretrievably gone and econom-
ic logic is about to return. It requires extensive forecasts and prog-
noses, investments that could be proﬁtable at least in several-year
terms, skillful management, etc. Furthermore, one should consider 
the decline and the rapid aging of the Bulgarian population and 
consequently a sharp decline in demand starting from food and 
beverages and ending in real estates. For that reason, drivers of 
economic growth in the future could be predominantly export-
oriented sectors.  
The reasonable question here is how to make Bulgarian compa-
nies successful abroad. Bulgaria still does not have any sector, 
product or service that is ultimately recognizable beyond its bor-
ders. The country loses its competitiveness because Bulgarian 
goods have to compete with these of countries which were able 
to depreciate their currency and now sell their production more 
advantageously. The country loses its competitiveness because 
of the lowest labor productivity in the EU. The country also loses 
its competitiveness due to insuﬃcient investments in lifelong
learning programs – Bulgaria occupies the last position in the 
EU-27. The country loses its competitiveness because the voca-
tional and university education is not tied to the business needs. 
Last but not least, the country loses its competitiveness because 
of the brain-drain of more than 1 mln. young and well educated 
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people who have left Bulgaria since 1989.
Nevertheless, how could the Bulgarian export be competitive 
provided that in comparison with some EU countries Bulgaria 
does not rely on national champions, does not implement slo-
gans as “Buy Bulgarian” and at the same time is exposed to pro-
tectionist environment. 
First and foremost, the Bulgarian image abroad should be polished 
and a lot has to be done in order to create a brand out of Bulgaria 
– if not from the whole country, at least from certain sector or pro-
duction lines. No matter how diﬃcult it looks from today’s point of
view, there are two channels the Bulgarian companies could use 
to make their goods and services popular abroad. On one hand, it 
could be reached by improving the functions of the Bulgarian trade 
representations, which are currently subordinated to the Ministry 
of Economy and work in rather bureaucratic than business manner. 
On the other hand, a more eﬃcient use of the international fairs
and exhibitions should be initiated that, though, is a very costly 
measure. In this regard, when it comes to agricultural products and 
food, a more considerable attention should be paid to EU support 
for their promotion where eligible activities are participation in 
fairs and exhibitions, tastings, TV, radio and print advertisements, 
etc. These programs for promotion of EU agricultural products are 
directed both towards the internal and external market.
Despite the present diﬃculties, there are many appropriate examples
of Bulgarian companies which operate on foreign markets where 
they compete successfully with multinational corporations and local 
players. What is more, these are not only companies which exported 
their production before the 1989 change. Therefore, one could con-
clude that the most essential thing Bulgaria has to change is the way 
of thinking. A way of thinking from inside towards the world outside, 
not from the point of view of a small Balkan country but from the per-
spective of a EU member state which, despite and exactly because of 
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CHAPTER THREE
IMPACTS OF THE GLOBAL CRISIS  
AND THE ROLE OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 
45
Florian Fichtl
Country Manager,  
World Bank, Soﬁa
The overall assessments are changing to the downsides as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) is revising its estimations 
and the World Bank is now predicting negative global economic 
growth in 2009 for the ﬁrst time since the World War II. In these
challenging but also interesting times, the interventions by the 
governments are constantly changing. 
In December 2008, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 
the entire world was still estimated to 1 %. This is no longer just 
a prediction and the sharper adjustments in commodity prices 
are not disputable. Globally, private capital ﬂows are expected to
decline in the future and in this situation Bulgaria shares the faith 
of some other countries that have pursuit prudent policies and 
nevertheless found themselves exposed (for example Germany). 
On the positive side, the public ﬁnances are in good shape in Bul-
garia. The public sector balance sheet is strong and the banking 
sector is very capitalized and proﬁtable. However, the global re-
cession will not leave Bulgaria unscathed. It will aﬀect the coun-
try through three channels. Export and capital ﬂows will decline.
The larger the decline, the larger the drop in growth will be. This 
brings up the question how should policies adapt. 
These are very general policy recommendations. It is prudent for 
Bulgaria to maintain ﬁscal surpluses; it is important that wage
grow is not exceeding productivity gains because last year in 
an overheating economy wage grows exceeding productivity 
gains impaired the competitiveness of Bulgaria. Additionally, 
Bulgaria was well advised to maintain the health of its ﬁnancial
sector. For a small open economy, the room to maneuver in ﬁs-
cal policies is very limited. With the currency board de facto this 
is simply not an option. 
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In the discussion only last year it was a big question- why not 
to spend the ﬁscal surplus, why to maintain it? It is related to 
the currency board: because maintaining ﬁscal reserves pro-
vides conﬁdence to investors in the banking system and be-
cause ﬁscal stimuli are not likely to be eﬀective in a small open
economy. In order to maintain large surpluses, when the reve-
nues are declining and very clearly expected to decline, spend-
ing them also needs to be reduced. Given these considerable 
uncertainties on the downside, nobody could predict in March 
what the year and revenue will be. So, certain buﬀers, certain
caution are well advised. 
Government has instituted this ten per cent rule and it is a pru-
dent measure that requires monitoring on an ongoing basis. 
The ten per cent rule is also a good idea because the original 
budget forecast was based on a larger GDP growth that will not 
take place now. Wage growth needs to slow. Wage growth in 
the past was driven mostly by the private sector not the pub-
lic sector. The government has already limited wage growth 
in the public sector. The underlying question is what the size 
of the public sector is, what the scope of mandate is and what 
the remuneration for the competent public sector is. There are 
number of issues to be addressed.
Given the limited room to maneuver and the diﬃcult regional
and global situation for Bulgaria, it all comes down to increasing 
the eﬃciency of spending and accelerating structural reforms.
Accelerating structural reforms is necessary to maintain compet-
itiveness of the public sector. Increasing the eﬃciency of spend-
ing will help make the most out of the existing revenues. This 
seems now more important than ever. Therefore, the crisis also 
provides an opportunity to advance the reforms. Modernization 
is really on the agenda in the dialogue with the government and 
all partners in Bulgaria. Sometimes, it is observed that it is dif-
ﬁcult to implement reforms in a period of expanding budgets
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and economic growth and a kind of counter intuitively it is easier 
in diﬃcult times. Therefore, perhaps this is now an opportunity
to advance some strategic reforms. If there is a requirement to 
reduce expenditures, across the board cuts are one way to deal 
with it and it will satisfy the bottom line and meet the objective. 
However, if one takes a look at more substantive issues, it will 
be better to go about implementing eﬃciency gains in a more
structured manner rather than across the board cuts. 
When a country faces a crisis, it should keep in mind the eco-
nomic recovery and at all circumstances protect expenditures, 
which safeguard the long-term productivity and competitive-
ness of an economy. Along the same lines, renewing expendi-
tures functions as high priority public investments and very im-
portantly ensure that the social safety net is functioning. Stock 
market decline might as well as the unemployment put a strain 
on the pensions and for Bulgaria we would expect the possibility 
of eﬃciency gains in the health sector.
In relation to the labor market, its ﬂexibility is important in terms 
of economic upswing and downturn. It is also important to pro-
tect the workers and not unnecessarily their jobs. For Bulgaria, 
resuming the convergence to EU average incomes, it is impor-
tant to raise labor force participation. If one takes a look at em-
ployment rates data from 2007, he will see that for the age group 
25 to 55 employment rates in Bulgaria have advanced to EU 
average level. That is the good news. On the elderly population 
– 55 to 65 there is room for further increasing participation. Of 
course, this is diﬃcult at that age. Strategically more important
is the 15-25 years group that is legging considerably behind EU 
levels. This directs the attention to the education system. If we 
look at the quality of the education, it is well known that Bulgaria 
scores higher according to the Pizza literacy levels (as lower you 
are ranking as higher the literacy level in your country is), which 
is not good news. Therefore, if we think about investments in the 
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social sector, education is one of the sectors to be protected. This 
is one of the areas for the government to continue investments, 
to continue modernizations. Particularly important are vocation-
al education and training as well as tutorial education system. 
 With reference to the economic recovery, if we look at the cur-
rent situation where global investments in general are declin-
ing, countries depending on foreign direct investments have to 
strike very competitive environment to attract these reduced 
foreign direct investments. It will be important to maintain a 
solid investment climate and to improve it. This is also true for 
Bulgaria which has done very well in terms of the investment cli-
mate overall, in terms of tax policies and tax administration, but 
there is still considerable scope for further improvements. The 
areas that should be highlight are the regulatory regimes, which 
are complex and burdensome. One might also want to add the 
judicial sector. Improvements in the performance there would 
also beneﬁt the private sector. The other area in line with the
Lisbon agenda is innovation and research and development. At 
various occasions World Bank has analyzed the sector and has 
made recommendations to improve the way these resources are 
spent in order to contribute at most to the development of the 
private sector. 
In conclusion, it is clear that 2009 and 2010 will be challenging 
for all countries in the world, for Eastern Europe and also for Bul-
garia. In a world with little appetite for risk tolerance for slippag-
es in terms of the reform agenda will be minimal. Fortunately, 
Bulgaria has a track record of strong policies and there is a basis 
for conﬁdence that this tendency will continue.
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1. What kind of crisis we are facing?
The crisis came out as a result of several factors. It started as a 
ﬁnancial crisis. It has certainly something to do with overproduc-
tion of goods but also of liquidity - in China particularly but not 
only there (in China several sectors were already injured –i.e. car 
industry is). It means that there was also overproduction in the ﬁ-
nancial market. The lack of regulations contributed largely to the 
outbreak of the crisis. It is also an institutional crisis because it 
develops in a world where the economic power balance is com-
pletely diﬀerent from the one that had been assigned to the vot-
ing rights of the main economic powers several decades ago in 
the leading international organizations. Thirdly, it is a geography-
related crisis because particularly Europe feels as a growth centre 
for the time being and probably for a longer time the center had 
shifted from Europe to Asia and the Paciﬁc region.
It has to be added that this crisis, in contrast with the previous 
ones, has developed in the developed world and immediately hit 
about 60 % of the world GDP. So, earlier plans and illusions that 
there will be certain countries like China, India, Latin America and 
even Russia, which would maintain a very high growth rate and 
which would be able to bail out the world economy on this cri-
sis, have to be discarded. If 60 % of the world economy is in this 
crisis, there is no other bailing out possibility than huge cuts in 
the current social security systems of all the developed countries. 
If the politicians are not ready to do it, we will not get out of the 
crisis. However, particularly at a period of deepening economic 
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crisis, there is no politician who would make this kind of suicide 
but we all will be suﬀering from it.
The second remark – the crisis has diﬀerent levels and we have
already most fully experienced the ﬁnancial aspect; we are in a
deepening economic crisis, although we have not reached the 
bottom line yet. It will be a deep, long crisis everywhere in the 
world, and not least in Europe. Next, the certain level is just now 
unfolding. We do not know now how deep the social crisis will 
be and ﬁnally we will have to reckon also that there will be an
ideological crisis as a result of the economic recession, social suf-
ferings, real income cuts, higher level of unemployment, etc. In 
all these areas, again how deep this crisis will be in the diﬀerent
levels largely depends on the role of the state. 
2. The overwhelming theory and economic practices con-
cerning the role of the state  
Meanwhile, the neoliberal ideology pleaded for very limited role 
of state, if any. State intervention was considered very harmful. 
Unfortunately, the crisis made it clear that market does not func-
tion properly without a certain regulatory and institutional sys-
tem. Therefore, we have to stay far away from any kind of liberal 
ideas, which is a bad thing because a lot of the liberalism would 
be needed for the market to function correctly. What has been 
one of the basic points is that the banking sector should be com-
pletely exempted of regulations and of state intervention. Nev-
ertheless, what we see today is not only state intervention ev-
erywhere –direct and indirect, but what we see is a capital crime 
according to the liberal theory and particularly in those coun-
tries, which were main propagators of the liberal theory – the 
USA and Great Britain where the state has already nationalized 
part of the banking system. 
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Finally, the liberal theory also stated that the lower the recentral-
ization of the GDP is in the state budget, the better it is as it is not 
crowding out private capital. However, we see it is not a new phe-
nomenon. What really does matter is not the share of the recen-
tralization through the central budget in GDP, but what is really 
important is how the state is spending the money, which is recen-
tralized. Scandinavian countries have a very high level of recen-
tralization (over 50% higher than in any other European country) 
and they are doing quite good. In the structure of the expenditure, 
there are three areas, which have very clear priority, and all of them 
are future-oriented: very heavy investment in education, a similar-
ly heavy investment in research and development and innovation 
and again heavy investment in health. These are the three factors 
of reproducing the high quality of human resources, which is the 
critical element in sustainable competitiveness all over the world. 
The question of what kind of state we will have in the future is 
very diﬃcult to answer. It will be a stronger state but we do not
know what will be the quality of it. Hopefully, we will not return 
to the classical traditional interpretation of the role of the state 
as father state of social subsidies and nationalized and patriotic 
economies. If we happen to come back to this, our perspectives 
and forecasts for the future would be extremely gloomy – much 
gloomier and darker than our current evaluation of the situation. 
3. Examples of direct or indirect state interventions
There are diﬀerent forms of state intervention as a result of the cri-
sis. First of all, we have to make a diﬀerentiation between direct and
indirect intervention. Direct intervention is where the state is as a 
state participating in the assets of a company. The indirect is protec-
tion, stimulus for economic recovery, damage limitation and some 
kind of a patriotic economic policy, which is extremely question-
52
able in Europe that is supposed to have a single market. If we have 
a single market, all these patriotic policies would destroy its normal 
functioning. Secondly, state intervention can be diﬀerentiated ac-
cording to sectors – banking, on one hand, and manufacturing, on 
the other. We have seen in the banking sector a very strong, to some 
extent justiﬁed, direct intervention of the state not only by recapi-
talization and nationalization of banks but also by giving separation 
of toxic assets and by giving guarantees to deposits. Much more 
controversial is the direct intervention of the state in the manufac-
turing sector and here again we should make a diﬀerence. One case
is the construction sector where some of the investments could be 
started a year or two earlier in order to maintain or moderate the 
higher unemployment. If resources are available, it could be sup-
ported. However, the intervention into the manufacturing sector, 
particularly the car industry, have had a very dangerous spillover 
eﬀect on several other parts of the economy. An intervention in
the car industry will immediately aﬀect about 30 to 40 other indus-
tries that are its subsidiaries, which are supplying it with diﬀerent
inputs – from rubber to plastics, from electronics to steel. The third 
element when we talk about state intervention is the time frame 
– is the intervention transitional or is it lasting? We know from pre-
vious experience that nothing is as long-lasting as the transitional 
measures. If something is transitional, what kind of vested interests 
will be strengthened and even if the state withdraws from the given 
sector, what kind of structure will remain there? Will this structure 
be more competitive or more protectionist than the previous one? 
4. International context of the role of the state
National states are in a process of globalization and there are 
some areas and challenges, which are unlikely to be success-
fully faced by the nation states.  The regulatory and institutional 
components of the crisis were mentioned beforehand and both 
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of them need an international solution, even if there are nation 
states that are participating or in case of the EU – just the union. 
Regarding the EU as an international context for all of us, right 
now it is experiencing direct bailing out activity in the banking 
sector, indirect intervention to some other sectors and some re-
covery plans, which have already been announced. 
What the crisis has shown is that in the ﬁrst period and even
today, unfortunately, nation states pressed by their nation-
al electorate, by politicians, seem to follow the old and the 
highly unsuccessful and risky road which the economists took 
through the ﬁrst oil crisis in 1973 – everyone for themselves
and God save the strongest. That is certainly not helping but 
that is what we have seen.
 We are much beyond the EUR 200 bln., which was communicated 
by the EC, but at that time in December, already EUR 170 bln. of 
it came from the national rescue plans. It had nothing to do with 
the common coordinated European policy. EUR 30 bln. could be 
more or less attributed to the EU- EUR 1 bln. to the European 
Investment Bank and the other part to the rest of the residual 
EU budget. What has become clear is that the monetary and the 
ﬁscal policy of the Union could not be harmonized. At the begin-
ning, in 1990-1993 when the monetary union was lounged ev-
erybody was convinced that sooner or later the monetary policy 
will automatically lead to more ﬁscal policy coordination. It did
not happen but more importantly the whole set of instruments 
of the Union has not been prepared for crisis management.
After 50 years of EU integration, nobody has been able to intro-
duce into the EU an instrumentarium or some kind of a policy mix 
in order to manage crises. Crises management remained on the 
national level. We see today that very much against the common 
economic theory and partially due to the lack of common Euro-
pean policy, the US dollar, which is the currency of an economi-
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cally weak state, has gained ground against the euro. The US did 
not resist the temptation of including about USD 45 bln. just in 
one year in order to rescue the US banks not by US money, not by 
taxpayers’ money in the US but through the so called hostile sav-
ior state  funds. That is how political ideology is giving ground to 
economic rationality. The danger is that world ﬁnancial markets
will become empty and then any kind of European recovery plan 
will face the same diﬃculty in ﬁnding money, as it is now the case
with some Central and Eastern European countries. It can become 
easily a universal or European situation. 
The third remark on the international context is the attitude and re-
action of the transnational companies to the crisis.  The transnation-
al companies did not take a deﬁnitive decision until now. They are
ﬂuctuating between two possibilities - one is to look around in the
world, look at their subsidiaries everywhere – from Brazil to Russia 
and from Bulgaria to Ireland and see which are the most competi-
tive ones and which are the least competitive ones. If they follow 
the economic rationality, they will have to close down those facto-
ries and activities that are the least proﬁtable. If these companies
happen to be in the so-called mother countries of the transnational 
companies, then these will have to be closed down. The other temp-
tation is that they will give priority to the national bailout plans and 
then will maintain jobs in the less competitive areas and the less 
competitive locations. Then, they will have to close down those that 
are more competitive, which will be a loss of competitiveness not 
only during the crisis but also in the post-crisis situation.  
5. Future oriented remarks on the potential alternatives 
seem to be the most important ones 
The state will certainly have much more important role in manag-
ing and remedying the negative social and budget consequences 
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in the future. The talk is mainly about recovery and bailing out 
plans but in most European countries budget deﬁcit will become
much higher than the 3 % and that is just the beginning of the sto-
ry. It will be rising and rising in the next couple of years. It could be 
managed at this moment if in the process of deepening recession 
old member countries such as France, Germany, let alone Ireland 
or Spain would cut social expenditure in the amount of 2 to 3 % of 
GDP. But that is politically impossible. Therefore, they will be facing 
a huge budget deﬁcit with inﬂation pressure in the next years.
The second problem is the growing diﬀerence just because such
plans have to be carried out eventually and they cannot be car-
ried out in a short period. Structural changes in the economy 
and in the budget need a longer period and here the political 
and the economic rationality are practically confronting each 
other. The economic rationality is that if we have a reform of the 
healthcare system or the public administration or tax policy, it 
needs about 6 to 10 years in order to have its full positive im-
pact. The political rationality is that as far as we are living in a 
democracy of 4-year electoral cycle we have to do everything in 
4 years. That is impossible and that is why big economic reforms 
have always been swept under the carpet in the last 20 years. 
The last threat is the potential ideological impact – particularly 
in the Central Eastern European countries. Practically we all have 
made a very rapid liberalization of trade and capital ﬂows in an
unprecedentedly short period. No doubt there was no other way 
in the period of globalization but if we now see that the state is 
taking back its role, state intervention is coming back in those 
countries which try to teach us how to behave in a market econ-
omy. We have already privatized much more to foreigners than 
the Western European countries did. It can create such an ideo-
logical backlash, which would be the hot bath of the worst kind 
of populism with all the consequences not only on the given 
country but also on the European stability. 
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For Bulgaria, the crisis is mainly imported. Except for a few seg-
ments of the construction, there are no inner reasons for cri-
sis in any other sector. The crisis entered the country via two 
channels – a decrease in the capital ﬂows and a drop in the for-
eign trade turnover, especially in the export, but for Bulgaria 
the slump of the import has economic signiﬁcance as it is con-
nected with quite a few business branches. We have problems 
with the budget revenues, real production and especially in 
the industry but on the other hand, we report a considerable 
decline in the inﬂation rate. Thus, in near future Bulgaria may
switch from concerns about high inﬂation to worries about too
low, maybe even deﬂation. It is of crucial importance to the
real sector. The crisis that started globally from the ﬁnancial
sector, could aﬀect the Bulgarian ﬁnancial sector via the real
one. In this way diﬃculties for our ﬁnancial sector may occur
but we should not forget that it is still very well capitalized and 
even proﬁtable at least according to the last data available.
From a Bulgarian perspective, government policies could be dis-
cussed from the point of view of the classical economic theories. 
According to the one promoting strong state intervention, the 
state supports the economy by various measures – increases in 
the budget expenditure, deliberate cut of the budget income 
and lowering of taxes. For instance, in the ﬁscal plan of Barack
Obama one may clearly discern both of the components. For a 
small open economy with a currency board it is naive to believe 
that the ﬁscal expenditures will be eﬃcient. They might have
positive short-term impact but they could not support the econ-
omy in a long-term perspective.
Bulgaria is in a state of fading economic growth, which was fos-
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tered mainly by the enormous foreign capital inﬂux in the coun-
try. In this respect, the main state policies should be directed to 
the management of these capitals. Surely, the net inﬂux of capital
decreases but the challenge is to regulate the process so that the 
economy could accommodate itself to the unfavorable develop-
ments in the global economic environment.
Firstly, the budget surplus and its maintaining certainly improves 
the country’s situation and image, especially when it comes to 
decisions from large international companies where to withdraw 
from and where to stay. 
Secondly, hereby, the European funds policy is important and 
due to the recent underperformance, there are considerable re-
serves towards Bulgaria. Even a slight improvement of the way 
Bulgaria administers the European money and the money of the 
Bulgarian taxpayers would considerably improve the inﬂux of
this capital – a sizable amount of which is currently frozen.
Thirdly, with reference to the trust in the Bulgarian monetary re-
gime and in the country in general and regarding the net inﬂux
of capital, it is again important for Bulgaria to achieve consider-
able success on its way to the Euro zone. To a large extent, it is a 
matter of policy-making. By all means, it is an important policy 
because in a ﬁxed exchange rate regime the country pays a high
price for its maintenance and in the current situation it is crucial 
to actually beneﬁt from at least some of the advantages. In order
to keep and even attract new foreign capital in Bulgaria, it would 
be helpful to observe a palpable move towards ERM II within 
the year. Of course, the health of the ﬁnancial sphere must be
maintained; presently, it is well capitalized and proﬁtable. There
are buﬀers both in the ﬁscal reserve and in the currency board
reserve of the National bank, so this money should not be spent 
on anything else. Thus, anyone willing to play on the Bulgarian 
market will be sure that at least the ﬁnancial system is stable and
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no cataclysms will be allowed.
If we go back to the inﬂation issue, two important policies stand
out. When there is a very low inﬂation rate or even deﬂation,
the ﬂexibility of the factor prices, in this case mainly the labor
costs, becomes crucial for the competitiveness and for the op-
portunity to adapt to the unfavorable conditions. In this respect, 
if necessary, the labor market policies of Bulgaria should pro-
vide possibilities for wage ﬂexibility, even downwards. In a long-
term perspective, Bulgaria has a relevant advantage because it 
does not have rigid systems that literary forbid the wages to go 
downwards, in contrast to many developed countries. It must be 
absolutely clear that wages in Bulgaria could go down in nomi-
nal values in order to maintain competitiveness and to improve 
productivity of labor.
Other ﬂexibilities that are important in times of crisis are the
barriers for entering and withdrawing from the market. The in-
struments available in Bulgaria for compulsory and voluntary 
withdrawal of companies from the market are in poor conditions 
when it comes to legislation, insolvency and bankruptcy proce-
dures for companies. “Kremikovtsi” is a typical example of these 
weaknesses. In a crisis environment, ﬁrms need to leave the mar-
ket due to the strong competition at the lowest possible social 
cost in terms of time and resources spent on decision-making. 
Of course, the social cost that will be paid by those left without 
jobs is a serious problem. However, in times of crisis these proc-
esses should not take too much time because the most impor-
tant thing is for the vital enterprises in the sector to have access 
to the free resources.
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In the current exposition under state of crisis, we will under-
stand a state in which regular instruments for macroeconomic 
policy do not function anymore, problems occur usually for the 
ﬁnancial system of the country and in that situation the main in-
stitutions in charge of the macroeconomic stability concentrate 
on the bailing out chieﬂy of the ﬁnancial system. In this sense,
Bulgaria is not in a crisis as the ﬁnancial system is stable and
does not need salvation. A slowing down process could be no-
ticed but the situation is under control and the basic macroeco-
nomic instruments used for the management of the economy 
still work. Actually, the main problem for the government and 
for all people who work in the sphere of macroeconomic policy 
is to maintain the status quo of the country; to keep it under 
control and not to allow any form of crisis. The main priorities 
of the macroeconomic policy are stated in the last state budget 
that is a fact. In the budget, one could ﬁnd explicit regulations
about public expenditures and instruments intended to keep 
the macroeconomic stability – to run 3 % budget surplus in or-
der to maintain the stability of the currency board and to keep 
the public expenditures within 40 % of the GDP. The treasury in 
particular has undertaken the obligation to make expenditures 
up to 90 % unless it becomes evident that there is no problem 
with the maintenance of the previous parameters. 
Due to various reasons, the economic picture at the time of the 
budget drafting was quite diﬀerent from the present one. The
surplus will probably be maintained by all possible means as 
long as it becomes urgent to make the most important public 
expenditures. From that point on, the budget surplus becomes 
a problem for the economy and it prevents the automatic stabi-
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lizers from functioning. Thus, in a certain macroeconomic situ-
ation this surplus could be reduced under the most important 
condition – to maintain the stability of the currency board. Of 
course, there are some priorities set in order to keep the eco-
nomic growth – certain public expenditures must be made; 
cares for the environment and the ﬂexibility of the labor market
must be taken as they are really signiﬁcant, especially when go-
ing out of the crisis.
For 7 years, Bulgaria has maintained very high growth rates. 
With a few exceptions, they were around 6 %.The momentum 
for them was the unusually high investments growth rate. Invest-
ments reached record-breaking levels as part of the GDP. Almost 
40 % of the GDP are due to investments. This is an unsustainable 
investment level and a decline should be expected even with-
out the ﬁnancial crisis. Investments growth rate is anticipated to
shrink dramatically, it might even turn negative. 
These investments were stimulated in various ways. The credit 
growth, the ﬁerce competition for market shares among the
banks and the consequent low interest rates were also of help. 
Of course, there was certain enthusiasm among investors who 
obviously were in a state of competition. As a result a huge 
amount of capital was accumulated in the economy and to some 
extent it did not correspond to the available labor force. The ef-
fect was a strong slump in the unemployment rate that went 
from very high levels (18 %) to around 5 % in a few years which, 
considering the structure of the population is a very low level for 
the Bulgarian economy. This is deﬁnitely under the equilibrium
levels. Despite the intensive growth, in Bulgaria one could ob-
serve certain misbalances in the economy. Actually, the budget 
surpluses accumulated year after year were used as brakes for 
these processes. The National bank increased the compulsory 
interest rates to 12 % and undertook a few other steps for reduc-
ing the credit growth.
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In the last three months of 2008, however, the economy slowed 
down noticeably. In practice, industrial sales have been shrink-
ing considerably since August. The National Statistical Institute 
already published the data for the last three months growth rate 
– 3 % and accordingly 6 % for the whole year. Obviously, the 
slowing down will continue at least for the following quarters. 
Largely it is connected with the negative shock that comes from 
abroad via the export. The export sales drop very dramatically. 
The wage problem was automatically transferred as a result of 
the labor force shortage. Wages rose signiﬁcantly. It is widely ac-
knowledged as a serious problem of the economy when wag-
es go ahead of labor productivity rates. These are more or less 
middle-term tendencies, which were most clearly visible in the 
past two and a half years. The most noticeable follow-up was 
acceleration of the inﬂation, especially in the last year, which
also reached very high levels before the international prices 
collapsed in August last year. So, again due to an external shock 
prices slumped drastically and at the moment we are expecting 
deﬂation. There are still a few points to be reached before deﬂa-
tion appears on our territory. Presently, the inﬂation is around 5 %
and it is not considered as very low yet.  
The main indicator revealing any misbalances in our econ-
omy is the current account deficit. It reached 25 % of the 
GDP, which is extremely high regardless of the indicators 
used. One cannot avoid interpreting it as growing risk for the 
economy. The most important question that interests home 
and foreign analysts is what will happen if the money that 
finances the current account deficit suddenly stops. First of 
all, it is worth mentioning that during the last years the cur-
rent account deficit was very well financed, a huge amount of 
money flowed in the Bulgarian economy (EUR 8,5 bln. direct 
foreign investments in 2007; EUR 6,5 bln. for 2008 according 
to preliminary data). Additionally, enormous financial flows 
were accumulated via loans and deposits in the banking sys-
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tem, which eventually lead to considerable extension of the 
currency reserves – about EUR 15 bln. at the highest level. We 
should pay attention to the fact by no doubt this rapidly in-
creasing current account deficit was due to the huge amount 
of money that entered the country and largely stimulated do-
mestic demand. The main issue at hand is whether the exist-
ence of a current account deficit combined with a potential 
suspension of financial flows could represent a threat for the 
stability of the currency board and the banking system. This 
threat is not as great as one may initially perceive it looking 
at the 25 % current account deficit. Actually, the answer lies 
in the very structure of the Bulgarian current account: huge 
trade deficit, comparatively stable service level as well as two 
more items – incomes and transfers.
What will happen to each of these items if the ﬁnancial ﬂows
seize? The answer is that it will considerably slow down domes-
tic demand and import of goods, which will lead to shrinking 
of the trade deﬁcit. However, these events will not endanger
the stability of the currency board but it will question the eco-
nomic growth. Provided Bulgaria is in a state of recession but 
not of crisis, the economic policy instruments will continue to 
function. The seizure of the ﬁnancial ﬂows will aﬀect the trade
and the economic growth but not the stability of the ﬁnancial
system. The same applies to the service sector. 
Two issues deserve special attention, the ﬁrst one being the
national foreign debt. Its structure consists of very large debt 
to the private and very small to the government sector. Thanks 
to the budget surpluses in the last years, at present, the foreign 
debt is around 15 % of the GDP which is a very law level even 
considering the Maastricht criteria. Thus, the national debt 
is not a problem. Nevertheless, what happens to the swiftly 
increasing foreign debt? One could observe that the private 
debt service, both bank and non-bank, is very low year after 
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year which means that it has been incurred under very proﬁt-
able conditions and consequently, it presents no big risk to the 
currency board.
In the same way, FDI that reached very high rate – EUR 30 bln. 
lead to the ﬂow out of proﬁts, which also aﬀects the current
account of the payment balance. Nevertheless, the ﬂowing out
also seems under control (4 % of all investments). In our point 
of view, the currency board will probably experience some 
pressure but under items, in particular, there are no signs of 
any critical income ﬂow-out levels that could endanger the
whole ﬁnancial system. Of course, it would be quite unfortu-
nate, if due to some reasons we observe ﬂee of capitals from
the country. However, it has to be connected with extraordi-
nary circumstances, which seems unlikely at this point.
Nadya Yorgova
Director “Economic Programmes and Projects”,  
Economic Policy Institute
(Summary and current trends)
Until recently, there were no disturbing indications within the 
economic forecasts on Bulgaria. The country still remains an at-
tractive investment destination. Some of the main reasons are 
as follows: low taxes in comparison to the other states in the 
region, yet low costs for qualiﬁed working force, relatively low
power costs. However, these positives should be only considered 
in short and medium terms. As long-term obstacles for foreign 
direct investments ﬂows should be considered the administra-
tive burden, institutional ineﬃciency, poor infrastructure.
A positive signal to the investors is also the stability presented 
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by the national budget surplus. On the other hand, it provides 
a proper functioning of the currency board and the financial 
stability. However, the budget balance at the end of the year 
may turn debatable, since the government in power under-
took a number of anti-crisis expenditures. Final estimations 
and up-to-date balance of the budget are yet to be done, but 
it is inevitable to restrict some of the expenses. It will be of 
great importance to the new government in power to give 
an answer to the question of which articles in the budget 
need cuttings. Moreover, this should maintain stability and 
provoke an economic growth but also should not oppose the 
current social policy followed and oriented to building quali-
fied human capital.    
 
Table 1
Main macroeco-
nomic indicators
2008 2009
I quarter II quarter III quarter IV quarter I quarter
GDP real growth rate (%) 7,0 7,1 6,8 3,5 -3,5
Industrial sector (%) 7,7 7,2 2,1 -3,7 -12,4
Service sector (%) 8,3 5,8 6,4 3,8 2,5
Exports of goods and 
services (%) 9,2 5,1 3,8 -6,0 -17,4
Imports of goods and 
services (%) 5,8 13,7 4,2 -3,2 -21,1
Table  2
Month  2009 January February March April May
CPI*(monthly growth rate, %) 0,8 0,1 -0,2 0,7 -0,3
CPI (12 month growth rate, %) 7,1 6,0 4,9 4,8 3,9
Sources: BNB, NSI, MF 
Recent macroeconomic dynamics and data for the first quarter 
(according to the National Statistical Institute (NSI), Bulgarian 
National Bank (BNB), Ministry of Finance (MF)) forecast future 
obstacles and worsen business climate, which will transmit 
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the crisis in Bulgaria even more notably. Some of the main 
concerns, demanding strong governmental interferences are 
related to the national economy and the channels through 
which crisis affects it. They consist in decrease in GDP growth, 
lower Foreign Direct Investment, difficult access to financing, 
decrease in exports, increase in unemployment rate and other 
effects related. 
Looking at the numbers (See Table 1), one could easily notice 
that the Bulgarian GDP real growth rate is declining within 
the ﬁrst quarter of 2009. Within the same period, the decrease
amounts to 3,5 % (y-o-y). It needs to be underlined that this 
decrease in GDP growth is measured on previous period basis 
and concerns the 1st quarter. This clearly shows that the crisis 
already aﬀects the economy. Within the GDP growth decrease,
the services sector still grows (though not that intensively as in 
the last year). Meanwhile the industrial sector’s data is shrink-
ing and forecasting serious problems. The value added of the 
industrial sector (y-o-y) is constantly decreasing from the last 
year middle and reaching the threatening decline of 12,4 % for 
the ﬁrst quarter of 2009.
According to Table 1 data, the growth of imports and exports 
of goods and services also turned negative from the middle 
of the last year. However, a positive inﬂuence could be found
in the currency account deﬁcit, which decreases, since the im-
port is declining quicker than the export. 
Another sensitive issue is the inﬂation rates in Bulgaria. It re-
mains on main, unfulﬁlled and disputable criteria on Bulgaria’s
way towards ERM II, respectively to the Euro zone. With its high 
rates of inﬂation during the last year, Bulgaria considerably
stood above the referent rates, ECB deﬁnes (see Table 2). Still, it
is assumed that these three countries are among the best de-
66
veloped ones within EU and on the other hand, Bulgaria would 
hardly reach their overall rates (inﬂation included), consider-
ing the low basic position, it obtains. 
The high level of FDI in the state since 2007 clearly indicated 
the same, and it resulted in a higher rate of GDP growth. It is 
logical to assume that the lower inﬂation rates are positive (in
crisis even deﬂation is foreseen). On the other hand, the index
itself for Bulgaria is far beyond the deﬁned by ECB referent rates
of 2 % “healthy” inﬂation within the Euro zone. In this manner,
a deﬂation could be considered a disturbing signal for the eco-
nomic stability of the EU. Reasons can be found in few directions 
such as lowered energy and oil prices, decrease in the domestic 
demand (to a high extend based on increased unemployment 
rate expectations) and lower rate of loans issued. Unfortunately, 
these processes are too threatening, having in mind that while 
an inﬂation spiral is dangerous, the deﬂation spiral may appear
even more dangerous and both of them are likely to reproduce 
themselves and lead to recession. 
Regarding the price indices (see Table 2), the variation amounts to 
-0,3 on a monthly basis. However, on a year basis, the same index 
is 3,9 %. This fact shows relative stability that Bulgaria maintains. 
On 5th of July, 2009 the Bulgarian society voted for a general 
change resulting in a change from socialistic-based to a center-
right cabinet. Generally, such politically oriented cabinet is sup-
posed to implement a less governmental role and more liberal 
ideas. On the contrary, one can observe more and intensive cri-
sis-provoked governmental intervening (direct and indirect), re-
gardless of the political parties in power. The matter of how and 
how much the new government will intervene in the given mac-
roeconomic dynamics described above is still to be observed. 
Anti-crisis measures to be taken by the new parliament will be 
1 Political party GERB anti – crisis program issued at 10 May 2009
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examined in more details below1. 
Several points are given as priorities. Firstly, the measures in-
clude a permanent dialogue among the government, busi-
ness and labor organizations. Such a measure is undoubtedly 
needed since the public opinion and expectations need to be 
correctly formed within the crisis situation. In this regard, it is 
crucial for the proper information to reach the masses, since 
in times of crises the public opinion may become extremely 
sensitive. Example to be given is the lack of trust in institutions 
in the dark years of 1996-1997 deep ﬁnancial crisis, when the
negativism reproduced itself and led to worsening the eco-
nomic situation in general. 
Another undoubtedly necessary measure is an actualization of the 
state budget and its harmonization with the new governmental 
priorities and goals. Such a move is needed as the budget itself is 
a “picture” of the economic situation. However, the basic economic 
indices have already deviated from the numbers set in the budget
Also, an affect is expected to be observed as a result of some 
pre-election campaign expenditures. That will probably influ-
ence upon the budget fulfillment. On the other hand, cutting 
the expenditures must be considered very precisely. Other-
wise, the budget buffer’s price may turn out to be unreason-
ably high. It might threaten the labor productivity by low 
educational and qualification capacity, bad health services, 
lower human capital quality and bad labor market state. In 
this manner, it will be crucial to find a balance between bud-
get revenues and expenditures without depriving of strategic 
expenditures. 
Another important role in the budget forming has to be played 
by the EU funds. Some of the main reasons pointed for freez-
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ing these financial sources are the broken dead-lines, lack of 
transparency in their management. Sharp measures in their 
future management are decided to be as follows: review of all 
the procedures, reporting them and turn to the prosecution; 
increase the audit and monitoring authorities’ capacity; start-
ing the anti-crisis measures according to the Operational Pro-
grammes (OP), developing the quality of performance within 
the OP Regional Development in regards to the municipali-
ties’ road network. Which of these goals shall be reached is 
still to be seen within the EC decision on whether to unfreeze 
the funding and to what extent. 
Within the measures, regarding the labor market, there would 
be programs, developed for transferring employees from the 
mostly aﬀected sectors (e.g. construction) to agricultural sector
(assumed to have much more room for development). Certain 
measures here are once again focused at EU support, partial or 
total. This is another issue reminding the necessity of worming 
the Bulgaria – EU relation and the measures to be taken in this 
direction, which could provide or avoid the chance for Bulgaria 
to participate in the common policies led. 
Turning to the budget revenues, the future policy-makers aim 
at lowering the tax and health insurance burden up to 5 %, 
this would result in higher disposals, provoking higher eco-
nomic activity. There are taxes and administrative procedures 
relieve also foreseen, aiming at opening working positions 
and increasing the potential investment activity. Although 
these measures are practically and theoretically proved to be 
effective, the budget balance needs to be a goal demanding 
higher direct and indirect tax revenues.  
In crisis situation, it is also crucial to improve the business cli-
mate. For quicker and less painful exit of the crisis, it would be 
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of a great help, if the program observed above is successfully 
maintained. The new government in power needs to find low-
er administrative obstacles and higher institutional capacity. 
Improving the business climate and the social environment 
could be also supported by investing in effective construction 
of infrastructure. Such social acquisitions are positive for the 
national well-being but still, the expenditures must be prop-
erly defined and coherent to the social measures for gaining 
well educated, qualified and quality human capital which re-
mains a long-term goal. 
To what extent the new cabinet in power will succeed in ful-
filling its anti-crisis goals depends on many different factors. 
Still, one is for sure – either the vote will be justified (even if 
it is partial) or the economic stability and prosperity forecasts 
for Bulgaria will go far beyond the x-axis.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE IMPLICATIONS ON THE LABOR MARKET
71
ANNA DELIBASHEVA 
Director,  
“European Funds and International Projects” Directorate,  
National Employment Agency
The channels through which the global ﬁnancial and economic
downturn is transferred to Bulgaria also include country’s labor 
market. The scheme through which we expected the negative 
inﬂuences to aﬀect the country includes few interrelations. The
need of extra workers will be reduced by the expected decline in 
the economic growth and even more – it may appear a need of re-
ducing the work force in some sectors and industries. On the other 
hand, this will lead to higher overall unemployment rates. More-
over, in the current situation, the unemployment rate is diﬀerent
for the diﬀerent state regions and as a result of the crisis these dis-
proportions are expected to deepen seriously. A decrease in the 
planned investments in human capital such as diﬀerent trainings
and increase of the wages is another aspect of the crisis’ inﬂuence.
For compensating the external negative eﬀects, another crucial
issue is the insuﬃcient ﬂexibility within the labor market.
In the beginning of this year, a governmental action plan for the 
employment was adopted for compensating the external inﬂu-
ences on the labor market. Using its tools, we have unemploy-
ment rate registered at 6,5 % in the beginning of the year. This 
means that the registered vacant positions are 1800 more than 
those registered for the same period previous year. The expected 
inﬂow of unemployed is 12 000 for February. This is also the re-
sult of mass dismissals. In this perspective it is that the employ-
ers prefer not to dismiss the workers on a mass scale rather than 
doing so with small groups but systematically and regularly. This 
way they are not obliged to announce that at the employment 
bureau for taking the necessary measures. 
This makes it quite obvious that we will observe gradual increase 
in the unemployment rates and the number of spare labor force 
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on the labor market. The Ministry of labor and social works takes 
the measures necessary to prevent long lasting unemployment 
of  dismissed workers. Thus, we aim at preventing the loss of 
any abilities and competences of the dismissed employees. An 
example of the envisaged programs for lowering the deﬁcit of
workers in diﬀerent sectors, which started in 2008, can be given.
We started with the sector of tourism, construction, and sewing. 
But then information about dismissals on a mass scale was re-
ceived and it appeared that our expectations did not match the 
real circumstances. As a result, these measures reformed and a 
new program was deposed in the Observation Committee. 
Coordination with the Observation Committee is necessary for tak-
ing given measures within the Operational Programme on “Human 
resource development”. As far as EC representatives are involved 
in the Committee, we found a new scheme on “Qualiﬁcation ser-
vices and encouraging the employment”. Within its framework, we 
provide an education for the unemployed ones for obtaining and 
improving their qualiﬁcation. The priority of this framework will be
given to the unemployed within the vulnerable groups. The main 
goal of this program is related to the successfully passed ones to 
be involved in a permanent employment. Of course, this is based 
on the researched employment opportunities. 
During this current economic downturn, we have run another 
program, providing qualiﬁcation of the dismissed as of 01.11.2008
employees, related to enterprises went bankrupt, internal restruc-
tures, shrinking the capacity or shredding parts of the production 
lines. In this relation, it has to be kept in mind that some serious 
funding is available under the Operational Programme on “Hu-
man recources development”. The program itself, consisting of 
eight priority axis, amounts to EUR 1.2 bln. altogether. Since the 
economic downturn will not last forever, we must make good use 
of this resource for improving the work force capacity. Otherwise, 
in some sectors we would face a deﬁcit of qualiﬁed personnel.
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There are few open calls for applications within the Operational 
Programme. The ﬁrst one is qualiﬁcation services for employees.
Everyone could apply for this call – an enterprise or a ﬁrm, train-
ing organization which would like to improve the qualiﬁcation of
its employees or to deﬁne the area for development of employees.
The program is very helpful because of the diverse inﬂuence it could
provide. It includes only providing a professional qualiﬁcation which 
is the most popular practice both on national as well as on supra-
national level.  Moreover, this ﬁnancial tool gives the opportunity
for the employees to obtain key competences, to study languages. 
These are competences, which used to be prioritized and nationally 
granted. Nowadays, the companies have the chance to receive the 
resource needed for improving their employees’ proﬁles.
Another scheme, related to unemployed young people up to 29 
years old, was started. They shall be trained in key competences 
such as obtaining computing skills and having a command of 
languages. Another scheme aims at the group of people above 
50 years old in order to be in line with the EU common policy 
regarding the lifelong learning. 
The European Commission declared its readiness to take part in the 
creation of new anti-crisis measures to be implemented.  Among 
the interesting ideas could be found the creation of “green” work-
ing places. The Commission is very open-minded and expects us 
to make the assessment of the current situation and what could 
be useful in this regard. There is a readiness the maximum dona-
tion thresholds to be increased in case that would be useful for 
overcoming the negative inﬂuence over human resources.
All the measures are related to the European Employment Strat-
egy and the goals set within it. The same could be observed in 
the renewed Bulgarian National Employment Strategy, aiming 
at improving the capacity of the working force, keeping the em-
ployment rates, combining the work experience with the family 
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life. Last but not least is the achievement of the so-called ﬂexi-
curity, which has to provide all of the opportunities that the ﬂex-
ible working hours could give to as more people as possible. This 
would lead to a part-time employment, only not as a step towards 
a painless dismissal of personnel but undertaking the guarantee 
for keeping their jobs. The situation has lately been very dynamic 
and the government and the policy followed is aiming at ﬂexibil-
ity and inﬂuence at each stage of the labor market development.
Alexander Zagorov
Confederational Secretary,  
Confederation of Labor “Podkrepa”
The state creates a better picture in the country by complement-
ing certain resources for the employment of people in risk. Real 
jobs and real employment could be found only where there is real 
production. The impact of the crisis on the companies reﬂects the
labor market. We must declare explicitly that Podkrepa supports 
the thesis that we need competitive economy and enterprises. In 
these enterprises, our trade union organizations are reliable part-
ners that together with the employers and owners work for the 
company’s future. They by no means lose their trade union iden-
tity because their main activities include labor right promotion, 
income increases and creation of better working conditions. 
We use new terms as quality of life, quality of the working envi-
ronment, labor well-being. Hopefully, it is not just a terminology 
adopted from the EU but a jargon that is successfully integrated 
into our reality. Working from a distance, self-employment, ﬂexi-
curity, lifelong learning – these are also new terms that set new 
directions. All these activities combine in one dynamic process.
Trade unions take part in the social dialogue on national, regional 
and branch level and also have representatives in the companies. 
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Their organizations are natural bridges between policies from 
the national documents and the business circles. Unfortunately, 
the social dialogue in our country is ineﬃcient and takes place
only for the sake of appearances. Therefore, after such inferences 
the Confederation of Labor Podkrepa and the Confederation of 
Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria left the National Council 
for Trilateral Cooperation. 
Bulgarian trade unions are not yet unanimous about the instru-
ments necessary to react to the crisis. The word goes about anal-
ysis, observation, etc. At this point, we do not know whether the 
crisis is temporary or it will become a way of life. At present, there 
are various opinions and positions expressed publicly. However, 
when it comes to mass redundancies and working time reduc-
tion, trade unions become rather sensitive. Unfortunately, recent 
observations do not give us reasons to be optimistic. Actually, 
the crisis is expected to spread in a distinct way and monitoring 
of mono industrial productions is necessary, especially of those 
related to the regional development (ore output, metallurgy). In 
most cases, the whole infrastructure of such regions is centered 
on these productions. There are many multinational companies 
whose behavior we could not predict well enough. According to 
diﬀerent statistics, SME comprise 97-99 % of the enterprises in
the country. In this situation, as trade unions we are unable to 
carry out extensive research but wherever we have trade union 
organizations, we try to make forecasts and to support those 
companies that generate sustainable employment.
In times of crisis, one of the directions possible is to intensify the 
civic dialogue or the bilateral one between trade unions and em-
ployers. Steps have already been taken to improve the quality 
and the frequency of the internal dialogue because trade un-
ion organizations are public networks that spread on national, 
branch and regional level as well as in the companies.
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What is also crucial in crisis conditions is to know what is life-saving. 
In this case, bailing out of the recession is only possible through 
successful human resources management. It is not in the capacity 
of a sole employer or of the state alone. Therefore, the dialogue cre-
ates opportunities for the participants in the labor market to clarify 
their interests, to discern the tendencies, to express their points of 
view and eventually to adopt applicable political decisions.
In conclusion, the crisis is a system of risks – risks that are both 
in the labor market and in those who play on it. They could be 
observed and thus managed. Trade unions try to participate in 
these exact processes through the dialogue.
Vladislav Goranov*
Economy and budget expert
The crisis originates from the fact that at certain point money 
that never actually existed simply disappeared. A liquidity crisis 
followed and it later transformed into a consumption crisis. The 
insuﬃcient consumption questions the economic theory of sup-
ply. Presently, it is a challenge even to produce something let 
alone something that is actually demanded. Bulgaria does not 
have large companies as Nokia, Mercedes, BMW. In the given sit-
uation, it is natural for the labor market to suﬀer because indus-
trial relations consist of capital and labor. Capital already passed 
through serious diﬃculties and now it is time for the social cost
to be paid. What is unique for the Bulgarian labor market is that 
employees from the construction sector do not enter it which is 
attributed to the existence of illegal employment. In this respect, 
Bulgaria stands a relative chance as it has signiﬁcant reserves on
the informal labor market. The role of the state is to continue ap-
plying pressure aggressively to the shadow economy, giving the 
* Since July 30, 2009 Vladislav Goranov is appointed Deputy Minister of Finance.
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real, sustainable business mechanisms a chance to survive. This 
way, it will create new, additional opportunities for the treasury 
and will curb the unfair competition that suﬀocates those know-
ing how to do business.
There is very limited space for direct subsidies as a tool to inﬂu-
ence labor market. The measure proposed by the trade unions – 
governmental granting, could have been acceptable, if we knew 
that the crisis will last for exactly three months. In this period, 
provided the government allots these BGN 120 and we know in 
the forth month the company will be stabilized, such a measure 
could be justiﬁed. But when we all know that the crisis will con-
tinue for at least two years, subsidizing could only bring about 
irrational expectations without real positive results. 
Until now, everybody sought only general description of the situa-
tion without making any proposals for speciﬁc solutions. The main-
tenance of useless budget surpluses, when the current account will 
no longer be a problem, is not a solution. It is another story that 
the planned surpluses will not be reached because the budget was 
drafted in completely diﬀerent circumstances. What could be done
is to leave the money to the economy instead of making ineﬃcient
public expenditures. Thus, this liquidity and consumption crisis will 
provide those who know how to do business with another chance. 
The state will not be in the position to restore those markets and 
businesses that have already disappeared. Provided the GDP is 
about 70 bln., even if we spend the ﬁscal reserve of 8 bln., the ﬁgure
is slightly more than 10 %. This money will be enough to supply the 
economy for two or three months. Therefore, the better choice is to 
leave this money to the people in the ﬁrst place.
Naturally, the state must not resign from the welfare beneﬁting of
the most vulnerable groups – those who cannot enter the labor 
market due to their social status. Those who are just about to leave 
the market should not be abandoned, too. The agency should 
78
study which sectors need labor force in order to avoid misbalances 
in labor force demand and at the same time talk about a crisis in 
employment. Presently, there are 40 thousand jobs available but 
nobody takes them. Here comes the role of the state with its 1 bln. 
and 200 thousands as well as with better research on labor demand 
and supply. This correlation should be created because otherwise 
we may mix unemployment with the labor force shortage.
Iskra Beleva, PhD 
Deputy Director,  
Institute of Economics at the Bulgarian Academy of Siences
In order to manage the processes, one needs to be closely fa-
miliar with their genesis and also with the factors that provoke 
them. 
Labor market enters the crisis in a relatively stable state. At the 
same time, it does not enter it in a perfect shape as the labor mar-
ket has been producing problems for years. They concern mainly 
youth and long-term unemployment as well as many other mis-
balances that will most probably ﬂourish in this speciﬁc crisis situ-
ation and will inﬂuence labor market in one way or another.
The external stresses for the labor market arise predominantly 
from the changes in the GDP, in the amount of foreign invest-
ments, in the import and export and in the domestic demand. 
Undoubtedly, the most important factor for the employment 
growth is the GDP and its dynamics. For a period of ten years Bul-
garia suﬀered from a huge crisis in the labor market which dates
back to the beginning of the transition period and the recovery 
started only in 2002 when we ﬁrst witnessed positive increase
in employment (four years after the GDP growth, so the lag is 
signiﬁcant). Despite the diﬀerences in the nature of the crisis and
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the whole situation, the country gained some experience that 
should not be forgotten when it enters once again into the dif-
ﬁcult part of the cycle and its negative eﬀects on the labor mar-
ket. For the period 1998 – 2008, the impact of the average 4,5 % 
GDP growth on the labor market equals 733 thousand jobs cre-
ated. Maybe in 2000 – 2008 the eﬀect was even stronger as there
were almost 400 thousand new workplaces created. Generally, 
1 % growth was tantamount to 70 thousand new positions. These 
ﬁgures suggest powerful inﬂuence of the GDP dynamics on em-
ployment. For the 1990 – 2008 period the ﬁgure is 0,56 % which
means that about 31 % of the jobs came from the growth. For 
2000 – 2008 it increases to 37 %.
Investments are a key factor in creating employment and it is time 
to remember what the policy in 1990 – 2000 included and how 
the 18 % unemployment was addressed in 1993. The government 
started with stimuli for the SME and the self-employed. Then, it 
switched to the regional programs in search of local eﬀects, to the
UNDP programs, to the World Bank intervention and its policy ad-
vices and when foreign investments ﬁnally started to increase in
Bulgaria, they become the impetus for employment development. 
The latter forms a strong correlation (correlation factor of 0,65 or 
about 72 % of the workplaces came from foreign investments). 
Undoubtedly, the other really important factors are import and 
export, especially export. Naturally, a slump in export is sure to 
have impact on employment, mainly in export-oriented sectors. 
Nevertheless, we should seek opportunities for restructuring of 
the export ﬂows and possibly search for alternative markets.
The internal problems of the labor market exist within the frame-
work of long-term unemployment, discouraged people and 
quality imbalances. Discouraged unemployed form a solid group 
of 152 thousand that lie by (October – December, 2008) and do 
not play on the labor market but now, when demand decreases 
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and supply increases, they will once again come forward togeth-
er with the biggest problem – long-term unemployed (of whom 
60 % have attended only primary school). This is the quality ex-
pression of the imbalance in the average annual rate between 
newly employed and redundant for 2008. These people remain 
unemployed simply because their quality features do not meet 
the requirements of the labor demand.
Experts are unanimous that employment will decrease and unem-
ployment will increase accordingly but they are rather diverse in 
their views of the rates. However, in general, 1 % unemployment 
in January 2009 equaled 37 thousand jobless people.
Possible counteraction policies should be oriented to the external 
factors and to the inﬂuence on their negative impact. Although the
government came up with its proposals, there is no consolidated 
position or vision what policies will actually be implemented.  The 
good news is the search of continuity in the basic principles of the 
packages proposed by the government. The diversiﬁcation of pack-
ages also shows a ﬂexible approach – provided some packages
prove ineﬃcient, the instruments that they embody need to be
transformed in the fastest way possible. What is missing in the pack-
ages and what are the problems? The ﬁrst great danger comes from
the opportunity to use the problems in the labor market in order to 
promote demands and claims that have existed for years. Everybody 
who keeps abreast with the market is familiar with the discussions 
about the burdens to the labor market, to the legislation and to the 
ﬂexibility. However, there are no argument-supported assessments
of what the proposed measures will actually lead to and why they 
have to be favored in the ﬁrst place. From this perspective, one has
to be extremely cautious and even suspicious when it comes to the 
variety of ideas in the public. In a situation of risk, one has to be a 
true adventurer in order to also play hazardously. Maybe it is wiser 
to stay calm and to keep the movements moderate.
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Nevertheless, there are a few positive aspects to be drawn from 
the crisis. Eventually, the current conditions could be used for a 
kick-start of the long-protracted restructuring of the labor force. 
Construction sector will shrink and illegal employment will come 
out of the shadows. Possibly, it will help the sector ﬁnd a more ef-
ﬁcient labor structure by dismissing unqualiﬁed workers and by
keeping the quality labor force. And those who lose their jobs will 
have the chance to requalify or improve their skills in the ﬁeld.
The time has come to talk more about how to increase the com-
petitiveness of the Bulgarian economy – by more eﬃcient restruc-
turing and deﬁnitely not by adopting ﬂexible instruments, includ-
ing wage-reduction. One must question the thesis that Bulgaria 
should gain competitiveness by highly qualiﬁed but cheap labor
force. Actually, this is already just a myth and unfortunately, it was 
not the best position for the Bulgarian labor market.
To begin with, we have to discharge those direct correlations 
present, so that we could increase our competitiveness in a state of 
currency board. We must use all channels for increasing administra-
tive and process management eﬃciency: of production, of labor
force management, of its contribution in the production manage-
ment and in this way to seek reserves for the labor force quality.
Kalin Marinov 
Executive Director,  
Economic Policy Institute
(Summary and current trends)
Undoubtedly, the labor market is one of the most vulnerable 
segments of the national economy during a period of recession 
and market instability. In the last nine months this principle is 
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visible and completely expected in Bulgaria. With the appearance 
of the ﬁrst peripheral waves caused by the ﬁnancial crisis in the
USA and Western Europe, the unemployment rate in the country 
began to increase steadily despite some of the short-term mea-
sures undertook by the Bulgarian government. Furthermore, 
after the record low levels of unemployment rate varying from 
5,5 % to 5,8 % in August and September 2008, an increase of two 
percentage points is registered in July 2009.
The downward trend of increase of the economic growth of Bul-
garia was inevitable even without the existence of the global cri-
sis as in its eve the national economy has already showed some 
indications of overheating and many of the sectors were work-
ing over their marginal norms. The inﬂows of FDI, which during 
the ﬁrst half of 2009 registered decrease of approximately 40 %
in comparison with 2008, were characterized by some basic fac-
tors. The most visible feature was the fact that most of the invest-
ments were directed towards earning rapid but unsustainable 
proﬁt – ﬁnancial mediation and construction. It could not be said
that the typical process of industrial migration from Western to 
Eastern Europe took place in Bulgaria as the cases of major in-
ternational companies which transfer a signiﬁcant part of their
production process in the country are still rare. Such permanent 
allocation of foreign investors in Bulgaria could be a trigger for 
the development of corporative policy towards the human capi-
tal and R&D in the private sector.
The eﬀectiveness of the labor market and perquisites to become
a source of competitiveness for the whole national economy 
could be determined by the following factors. The ﬁrst step is to
be measured the level of qualiﬁcation of the labour force. The im-
plementation of national policies emphasizing predominantly on 
the life-long learning and the prequaliﬁcation hides some risks of
accelerating the trend from the recent years of constant decrease 
in the average level of the acquired knowledge and skills by the 
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youth after graduating from secondary schools. Such way of pro-
graming of the national priorities could provoke an emerging of a 
closed cycle. Instead of providing additional qualiﬁcation to the in-
dividuals after they graduate from secondary school and universi-
ties, this kind of programs are in a way directed towards the weak-
nesses of the educational system. In fact, these weaknesses should 
not be tackled on individual level but on the level of improving the 
educational system as they have deepened in recent years.
Another important factor, which inﬂuences directly the eﬀec-
tiveness of the labor market is the labor legislation and the 
established insurance framework. The obstacles here could 
be outlined in terms of the regulation of the part-time work 
contracts. The level of the employees of part-time contracts is 
around 2,8 % in 20082 and this is one of the lowest levels in the 
EU. Only Slovakia registered lower level at approximately 2,7 %, 
while the Netherlands hold the highest share at about 47 %. The 
countries which joined the EU in 2004 and Romania have val-
ues of this indicator varying in the gap between 4,6 % and 9,9 % 
and there is a common tendency, contrary to Bulgaria, for a 
slow decrease or keeping the same levels.
Reforms are also needed in the labour legislation in the field of 
fixed-time contracts. Improvement of this component would 
allow more accurate planning of the corporative and project 
expenditures and would raise the level of labour mobility. In 
Bulgaria, within the period 2005-2008, the levels varied be-
tween 5 % and 6 % while the average level for the EU was 
approximately 14 %3. Usually this index is higher in national 
economies with well developed sectors with seasonal char-
acter such as agricultural sector, food producing, tourism and 
construction. Currently, the Bulgarian Labour Code allows a 
second fixed-time contract to be signed with the same em-
2 Data source: EU
3 See EURstat stat
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ployee only once for a period of one year. This is a great bur-
den to the business as in some cases the firms need to employ 
worker for one or two months and they are obliged to do that 
for a one-year period. The European Commission also provid-
ed the Bulgarian government with prescriptions to undertake 
some measures to ease this regime.
The worsening of the economic reality provokes an increase 
in unregistered employment, contrary to the tendency of 
bringing the labour market out of the grey sector in the re-
cent years. After the achievements in this aspect, reached as 
result of the implementation of the 10 % flat tax and the abol-
ishment of the non-taxable minimum, now the trends are in 
the opposite direction. The effects of eventual implementa-
tion again of the non-taxable minimum will be in fact a “step 
backwards” and will stimulate registration on the lowest pos-
sible salary threshold as the rest of the amount will be paid 
without announcement in the tax agency. At the same time, 
the positive effects of this measure will be limited to the very 
low number of employees which are actually registered on 
this lowest threshold of the salary levels.
The only possible amendment could be the decreasing in the 
insurance burden to the employees. However, this is a very 
risky approach in the current situation of high government 
expenditures.
